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INMATES FOR RENT, SOVEREIGNTY




In 2009, Belgium and the Netherlands announced a deal to send
approximately 500 Belgian inmates to Dutch prisons in exchange for a £26
million annual payment.' The arrangement was unprecedented but justified
as beneficial to both nationS2: Belgium had too many prisoners and not
enough prisons, whereas the Netherlands had too many prisons and not
enough prisoners.3 It was, the two governments and other observers
J.D. Harvard Law School, 2011; B.A.Yale University, 2007. Thank you to the participants on
the panel "Penal Policy, Prison Privatization and the Global Prison Market" at the 2013 Law and
Society Association Annual Conference for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
Thanks also to the members of the Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal for their excellent
editorial assistance. All errors, omissions, and opinions remain mine alone.
I. See, e.g., Vincent Moss, Send British Inmates Abroad to Ease Overcrowding Says Labour
MP, THE MIRROR (Jan. 15, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/send-british-
inmates-abroad-to-ease-158584#ixzz2Qs7qnREj; Belgium Sends 500 Inmates to Netherlands After
Renting Prison for E26m a Year, THE DAILY MAIL (Feb. 5, 2010, 8:32 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ncws/article-1248947/Belgium-sends-500-inmates-Netherlands-renting-
prison-26m-year.html#ixzz2Qs7CFlry [hereinafter DAILY MAIL].
2. As discussed infra, convict-leasing was certainly a recognized practice in the United States
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but that model generally involved the leasing of
incarcerated individuals to private actors for labor purposes as opposed to the leasing of inmates from
one carceral institution to another. See, e.g., ASATAR P. BAIR, PRISON LABOR IN THE UNITED
STATES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 10, 31, 131 (2008); MARIE GOTTSCHALIC, THE PRISON AND
THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 48-52 (2006). Similarly, as
discussed at length infra, domestic transportation of prisoners, fueled at least in part by fiscal interests,
is not unheard of. However, regardless of how closely these analogs resemble the Belgian-Dutch
exchange, they are clearly distinguishablc from an exchange via treaty between nation states.
3. See, e.g., Moss, supra note 1; DAILY MAIL, supra note 1; Belgium to Rent Dutch Jail Cells,
BBC (Oct. 31, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8335868.stm; Alan Hope, Belgian Prisoners to Move
to Dutch Jails, FLANDERS TODAY (May 26, 2009), available at http://www.flanderstoday.cu/current-
affairs/belgian-prisoners-move-dutch-jail ("The situation in Belgium's jails was highlighted last week
when it was revealed that Ypres' prison currently holds 109 prisoners, despite having a nominal
capacity of only 55. Also, Bruges' prison has 751 inmates for a capacity of 632. Throughout the system,
the situation of men sleeping on a mattress on the floor of a two-man cell is commonplace. Alternatives
are beset with difficulties: while there are 748 offenders now on release under electronic surveillance,
the waiting list of those suitable for that programme is now over 1,300. While there arc enough ankle-
bands to go round, there is a shortage of staff to monitor the system.").
509
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explained, simple economics, a case of people helping people (or, more
precisely, nations helping nations).4 Supply had crossed semi-permeable
borders to meet demand, yielding an efficient solution to a multinational,
carceral dilemma. Unlike the case of Australia or other historical prison
colonies,5 independent sovereign nations had negotiated on equal footing
and reached an agreement with mutual benefits.
The prisoners have since changed hands, and the deal has not been
replicated (despite reported interest from Britain and some vague
comments by then California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger), nor has
it triggered sustained criticism or received significant scholarly treatment.
Indeed, outside of a single blog post by international law scholar Eugene
Kontorovich,' no U.S. legal academic has publicly weighed in on the
exchange, its merits, or its potential impact on domestic or international
carceral policy. A lone report by the European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
("CPT") prepared in the spring of 2012 after the transfer had already
occurred stands as the authoritative voice on Belgium and the Netherlands'
transnational prisoner exchange, providing a brief and largely uncritical
account of the situation and its impact on the well-being of the inmates
affected.'
4. See, e.g., Trading Prisoners in the Low Countries: It's a Deal, THE ECONOMIST (July 22,
2010), http://www.economist.com/node/16636011 ("On February 5th this year, the Dutch and Belgian
governments drew the logical conclusion, and agreed on a deal."); Eugene Kontorovich, Prisoner
Offshoring, or Gaolbalization, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 19, 2012, 8:25 AM),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/l 1/19/prisoner-offshoring-or-gaolbalization/ (describing the exchange as
an example of a properly functioning market and a demonstration of the power of market transactions to
resolve social, political, or economic problems).
5. See Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex
Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 101, 109-11 (2007).
6. See Wyatt Buchanan, Governor Looks South of the Border for Prisons, S.F. CHRONICLE
(Jan. 26, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Govemor-looks-south-of-the-border-
for-prisons-3274745.php#ixzz2RFq8rLkI ("Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger said Monday that the state
could save $1 billion by building and operating prisons in Mexico to house undocumented felons who
are currently imprisoned in California."); Moss, supra note I (discussing the suggestion that English
prisoners might be transported to and incarcerated in Polish prisons).
7. Kontorovich, supra note 4.
8. EUR. COMM. FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE & INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT
OR PUNISHMENT, REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS ON THE VISIT
TO TILBURG PRISON CARRIED OUT BY THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE
AND INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (CPT) FROM 17 TO 19 OCTOBER 2011
(2012), available at http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/bell2012-19-inf-cng.pdf [hereinafter "CPT
Report"].
510
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This Article begins to fill that critical void by examining the possible
implications of this exchange and of a global market in prisoners, and by
exploring the troubling ways in which such a market may reflect or mimic
domestic criminal justice policies and practices. With scholars in the
United States and abroad struggling to define, understand, critique, and
remedy ever-accelerating and seemingly unstoppable movements to
criminalize and incarcerate, 9 the Northern European prisoner exchange is
ripe for the picking, or perhaps picking apart. An explicit end-around by
state actors to maintain both prisons and prisoners in the face of economic
and socio-political constraints, the exchange provides a real-world example
of how the drives to criminalize and incarcerate interact with both
economic challenges in increasingly debt-ridden nations and the firmly
entrenched industrial complex surrounding the maintenance, staffing, and
construction of prisons.10
9. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (assessing the history of and factors behind mass incarceration of
African-Americans); KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS (1997) (examining the relationship between reported incidence
of crimes, levels of support for crime, and public support for punitive measures); DAVID GARLAND,
THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2002)
[hereinafter GARLAND, CULTURE OF CONTROL] (considering recent trends in the U.S. and U.K. penal
systems); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF
THE NATURAL ORDER 196-239 (2011) (exploring the ideas of natural order and legal despotism and
their potential influence on the state of the penal system); DOUGLAS N. HUSAK,
OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008) (assessing the causes of
"overcriminalization"); NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND
PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES (2008) (examining the institutional factors shaping
criminal justice policies in democracies); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE
WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007)
(describing the impact of the War on Crime on America); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011) (detailing the historical circumstances responsible for the current
state of the criminal justice system); BERT USEEM & ANNE MORRISON PIEHL, PRISON STATE: THE
CHALLENGE OF MASS INCARCERATION (2008) (analyzing empirical data on mass incarceration);
LOIC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL
INSECURITY (2009) (explaining social forces driving penalization of the poor); BRUCE WESTERN,
PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2007) (detailing the impact of the growth of the penal
system on minorities and the poor); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND
THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003) (exploring the roots and development
of harsh punishment practices in America).
10. The term "prison industrial complex" has entered the criminological lexicon as a means of
describing the relationship between carceral policies and the assorted private and public interests
affected by the policy decisions. See generally ANGELA DAVIS, THE PRISON INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
(1999). See also ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 84-85 (2003) ("The notion of a prison
industrial complex insists on understandings of the punishment process that take into account economic
and political structures and ideologies, rather than focusing myopically on individual criminal conduct
and efforts to 'curb crime."'); Gabriel Arkles, Correcting Race and Gender: Prison Regulation of
Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 23:509
In an effort to begin the conversation about the potential birth of a
new, globalized market in prisoners, this Article suggests three frames
through which we might view the Belgian-Dutch exchange: (1) prison
labor in the realm of globalized labor markets (necessarily complicated by
the status of the workers as prisoners); (2) democracy, sovereignty, and the
role of community in criminal punishment; and (3) international trade or
the exchange and regulation of resources. Accordingly, this Article will
proceed in three Parts, with each Part dedicated to addressing the exchange,
its significance, and the critical inquiry associated with each legal regime
or theoretical area. Further, each Part will take up the question of
exceptionality: should concerns about the possibility of a global market in
prisoners be viewed as practically and conceptually new and different from
current trends in prison policy, or are they simply more easily identifiable
or more egregious versions of the same issues that define (or plague)
domestic carceral institutions and legal regimes?
The first Part will examine the questions raised by viewing the
prisoner as worker. If prisoners are performing work-whether
manufacturing, service or other, generally remunerative or compensated
tasks-then the exchange should be situated within the broader discourse
regarding regulation of the cross-border flow of labor. If we view the
exchange of prisoners as a form of labor transportation or trafficking, then
how does this market complicate the already troubled global migration of
workers? Further, how does the international dimension of the exchange
change the calculus regarding the acceptability or desirability of forced
prison labor in the United States and other nations? In addressing these
questions, this Part will briefly examine the role of prison labor in the
United States and the potential doctrinal relationship between its regulation
and the treatment of transnational labor.
Social Hierarchy Through Dress, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 859, 865 n.26 (2012); Kimberld W. Crenshaw,
From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionally About Women, Race, and
Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REv. 1418, 1420 n.] (2012); Mike Davis, Hell Factories in the Field: A
Prison-Industrial Complex, THE NATION (Feb. 20, 1995), at 229, http://road-trip.syntone.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/04/davis-mike-hell-factories-1995.pdf (identifying the "prison industrial
complex" as "a monster that threatens to overpower and devour its creators, and its uncontrollable
growth ought to rattle a national consciousness now complacent at the thought of a permanent prison
class"). Viewed through such a descriptive lens, as discussed infra, prisons and other carccral facilities
are not important institutions simply because of their function as spaces to detain criminals, but also as
employers and drivers of local and national economies. Cf Norman R. Cox, Jr. & William E. Osterhoff,
The Public Private Partnership: A Challenge and an Opportunity for Corrections, in PRIVATIZING
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 113, 117-20 (Gary W. Bowman, ct al., eds., 1993) (describing the
interactions between public prisons and private industry in the 1980s and early 1990s).
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The second Part will address the prisoner exchange through the
broader lens of criminal punishment and its purposes. Specifically, this Part
grapples with common theoretical justifications that involve ideals of
community or a democratic polity and the necessary challenges to these
bases for incarceration posed by a regime in which outsiders are imported
for punishment. This line of inquiry ultimately leads to an examination of
the U.S. federal system and the cultural differences between those being
incarcerated and those doing the incarcerating, even in ostensibly domestic
spaces or socio-political units. By challenging the relationship between
punishment and socialization/community safety, this Part will begin to
raise the possibility that the market in prisoners undermines accepted
justification for state authority and state violence. Further, this Part
questions how such an exportation of sovereignty or an exchange in
community values might affect both prisoners' treatment and their ability
to seek legal redress for mistreatment or abuse relating to their
confinement.
Finally, the third Part will examine the market for prisoners by
considering the function of inmates as a commodity or perhaps a
resource-the fuel necessary to support a substantial industry and
infrastructure devoted to punishment and incarceration. In doing so, this
Part takes a step back from concerns for prisoners or their well-being that
necessarily underlie the other two theoretical and legal frameworks
explored in this Article. Instead, this frame implicates the peculiar
institution of incarceration as is it has come to operate in post-industrial
capitalist and quasi-capitalist political economies. Punishment, with all of
its moral components and ideological and theoretical foundations, also
serves a basic economic function-to support and maintain a set of
industries and employment opportunities. Similarly, it has become an
almost intransient component of the contemporary nation state, not only
because of some concern for public safety, but because of a conception of
the state that is inseparable from the social, economic, and legal
institution(s) of punishment and incarceration.
By suggesting such a multiplicity of readings, this Article argues that:
(1) our normative take on the exchange and on future exchanges requires
an honest engagement with the distributive and social-structuring stakes of
the market; and (2) an examination of the legal frameworks associated with
the lens discussed in each Part forces a set of uncomfortable parallels to
U.S. criminal justice policy. In short, this Article ultimately argues that by
examining what seems instinctively wrong with this globalized market
through each frame, we may better identify and correct the policies that
2014] 513
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have come to shape the unsustainable and destructive space of the U.S.
culture of incarceration as well as appreciate how the institution of "the
prison" has taken on a life of its own as an essential component of
globalized and globalizing post-industrial economies."
The practice of international leasing of inmates and prison space and
the potential for its replication, given U.S. prison crowdingl 2 and the rise of
the carceral state, stand as markers of the close nexus between neoliberal
globalization and the entrenchment of the prison industrial complex as a
sociolegal entity.' 3 By exploring this link, I suggest that the Belgian-Dutch
exchange is actually emblematic of a departure from traditional "theories of
punishment" and represents a normalization of the prison as a staple of
social and economic life.' 4 Further, in focusing on U.S. analogs to this
exchange, I emphasize that the ostensibly unique Belgian-Dutch treaty
bears much in common with contemporary, domestic carceral policy. It
I1. In suggesting this multiplicity of readings, I also mean to take up the challenge posed by
David Garland that critics of the criminal justice system should consider "punishment as a social
institution." DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL
THEORY 287-90 (1990) [hereinafter GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY]. See also id. at
287 ("[U]nderlying any study of penality should be a determination to think of punishment as a
complex social institution[,] . . . something akin to Mauss's idea of 'total social fact,' which on its
surface appears to be self-contained, but which in fact intrudes into many of the basic spheres of social
life." (footnote omitted)); id. at 290 ("[Ihf one wishes to understand to evaluate the prison as an
institution . .. it does little good to do so on a single plane or in relation to a single value. Instead, one
must think of it as a complex institution and evaluate it accordingly, recognizing the range of its penal
and social functions and the nature of its social support.").
12. The increasing problems of inundated U.S. prisons is perhaps best encapsulated in the
Supreme Court's condemnation of California state prison conditions in Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910
(2011). In concluding that a three-judge district court panel had correctly found widespread
constitutional violations in the housing of inmates, the Court summarizes a wealth of statistical
evidence of the inhumane conditions that prevailed in California. Id. at 1923-24 ("The degree of
overcrowding in California's prisons is exceptional. California's prisons are designed to house a
population just under 80,000, but at the time of the three-judge court's decision the population was
almost double that. The State's prisons had operated at around 200% of design capacity for at least II
years. Prisoners are crammed into spaces neither designed nor intended to house inmates. As many as
200 prisoners may live in a gymnasium, monitored by as few as two or three correctional officers. As
many as 54 prisoners may share a single toilet."(citations omitted)).
13. Bernard Harcourt has recently offered a compelling account of the interdependence between
neoliberal orthodoxies that favor lack of economic regulation and sharply accelerating criminalization
and incarceration. See generally HARCOURT, supra note 9. Cf GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN
SOCIETY, supra note I1, at 289-92 (discussing punishment as a social institution).
14. In constructing this argument, I adopt a similar posture to the one staked out by Sharon
Dolovich in her treatment of private prisons. See Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private
Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 542-46 (2005) (arguing that the private prison, although perhaps a more
clear example of the troubling confluence of private interests at play in the U.S. criminal justice system,
is less exceptional than it is a "canary in a coalmine," a sign of broader trouble in the structuring of
carceral policy).
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may be that entering a global market in prisoners would raise a number of
constitutional questions or logistical challenges. Indeed, despite his positive
take on the exchange, Kontorovich recognizes that such a practice would
face substantial issues in the United States because of "constitutional
difficulties."" But is such a system so far-fetched in a nation where states
already send inmates across borders via contracts with private prisons?' 6
II. THE PRISONER AS WORKER: UN-FREE PRISON LABOR
Given the limited literature on the Belgian-Dutch exchange, the
dynamics of how prisoners subjected to this exchange are assigned to and
compensated for tasks remains somewhat unclear. Nevertheless, it is clear
from the CPT Report that prison labor remains a component of
incarceration under both the Dutch and Belgian models and on either side
of the cross-border exchange.17 The Report states that "[e]ach prisoner
benefits from four hours of work per day in a workshop."' 8 Additionally, in
its limited range of recommendations and critiques of the exchange, the
CPT identifies problems with rates of inmate compensation:
[A] number of prisoners complained of a considerable wage reduction-
in some cases to one-third-as compared to the pay that can be received
in prisons in Belgium. This reduction stems, in part, from the fact that the
number of hours of work in the workshops is limited to 4 hours per
working day. Aware of the situation, the Dutch prison management has
said that it was seeking ways of increasing the supply of work. The CPT
wishes to receive information about the results subsequently achieved in
this respect."
Thus, while we can only speculate as to what role inmate labor might
play in other transnational exchanges or how it might be modified or
negotiated, it would be unwise to disregard carceral labor as a component
of a global prison market given its prevalence and role in the Belgian-
Dutch exchange. Therefore, the role of inmate labor in the global prison
market remains a necessary realm of exploration. Accordingly, this Part
15. Kontorovich, supra note 4.
16. See Shymcka L. Hunter, Note, More Than Just a Private Affair: Is the Practice of
Incarcerating Alaska Prisoners in Private Out-of-State Prisons Unconstitutional?, 17 ALASKA L. REV.
319, 319-20 (2000) ("Because of overcrowding, the Department of Corrections . . . entered into a
contract with Corrections Corporation of America ["CCA"] . . . whereby CCA would transfer
approximately 200 Alaska prisoners to its Central Arizona Detention Center in Florence, Arizona.").
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examines the transnational exchange of inmates through the lens of prison
labor and international labor regulation.
A. "FACTORIES WITH FENCES"
In the United States, prison labor has attracted significant academic
attention of late,20 as an increasing portion of the population engages in
forced labor behind bars, outside of the purportedly free market.21 Indeed,
while convict labor is far from a new phenomenon,22 it has received greater
20. See, e.g., DONALD F. TIBBS, FROM BLACK POWER TO PRISON POWER: THE MAKING OF
JONES V. NORTH CAROLINA PRISONERS' LABOR UNION (2012) (examining the "Prison Union
Movement"); DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF
BLACK PEOPLE IN AMERICA FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR 11 (2008) (detailing the manner
in which county court systems facilitated forced labor through convictions); Andrea C. Armstrong,
Slavery Revisited in Penal Plantation Labor, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 869 (2012) (comparing prison
labor to enslavement); Micah Globerson, Using Border Trade Adjustments to Address Labor Rights
Concerns Under the WTO, 3 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 48, 68-71 (2013) (describing international
treatment of goods produced by prison labor); Steve Fraser & Joshua B. Freeman, In the Rearview
Mirror: Barbarism and Progress: The Story of Convict Labor, 21 NEW LAB. F. 94 (2012) (providing a
brief history of inmate labor); Genevieve LeBaron, Rethinking Prison Labor: Social Discipline and the
State in Historical Perspective, 15 WORKING USA J. LAB. & SOC'Y 327 (2012) (explaining capitalist
society's dependence on prison labor); Alex Lichtenstein, A "Labor History" of Mass Incarceration, 8
LAB: STUD. IN WORKING CLASS HIST. OF THE AM. 5 (2011) (detailing the recent history of prison
labor in the U.S. economy); Raja Raghunath, A Promise the Nation Cannot Keep: What Prevents the
Application of the Thirteenth Amendment in Prison, 18 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 395 (2009)
(criticizing courts' treatment of prison labor under the Eighth and Thirteenth Amendments); Jenifer Rae
Taylor, Constitutionally Unprotected: Prison Slavery, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Criminal
Exception to Citizenship Rights, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 365 (2011-2012) (pointing out the disparate impact
of laws and the criminal justice system on minorities); Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of
Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic Dimensions of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 857 (2008) (using prison labor to illuminate economic aspects of employment law); Colleen
Dougherty, Comment, The Cruel and Unusual Irony of Prisoner Work Related Injuries in the United
States, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 483, 485 (2008) (arguing that the Supreme Court should resolve
the disagreement among circuit courts about the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to prisoner
injuries as a result of faulty prison equipment); Matthew J. Lang, The Search for a Workable Standard
for When Fair Labor Standards Act Coverage Should Be Extended to Prisoner Workers, 5 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 191 (2002) (examining various court decisions regarding the coverage of prisoner-
laborers by the Fair Labor Standards Act); Ryan S. Marion, Note, Prisoners for Sale: Making the
Thirteenth Amendment Case Against State Private Prison Contracts, 18 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS.
J. 213, 215 (2009) (arguing that, given the Thirteenth Amendment's history and the current state of
private prison contracts, inmates who work in privately owned facilities have a constitutional claim with
regards to the "Punishment Clause"); Chris Weaver & Will Purcel, Comment, The Prison Industrial
Complex: A Modern Justification for African Enslavement?, 41 How. L.J. 349, 353 (1998) (concluding
the "prison industrial complex is a continuation of the legacy of slavery and the exploitation of African
people in America").
21. See Zatz, supra note 20, at 868 ("Although laments over the 'idleness' of prisoners are not
uncommon, well over 600,000, and probably close to a million, inmates are working full time in jails
and prisons throughout the United States." (footnotes omitted)).
22. See BAIR supra note 2, at 31, 131; GOTTSCHALK, supra note 2, at 48-52.
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treatment and criticism in the peculiar contemporary economic moment in
which employment numbers are floundering and industry in the United
States (and many other Western democracies) is waning, while increasing
members of the population are confined in extra-market labor relationships.
Further, the commonality of labor in correctional facilities combined with
the facilities' growing populations has led to a body of uncertain and
unsettled case law as courts grapple with how to define these work
relationships and how they should relate to state and federal legal regimes
governing the workplace.23
Writing for a unanimous Seventh Circuit panel, for example, Judge
Richard Posner has strongly denounced arguments that prisoners should be
protected by the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"):
People are not imprisoned for the purpose of enabling them to earn a
living. The prison pays for their keep. If it puts them to work, it is to
offset some of the cost of keeping them, or to keep them out of mischief,
or to ease their transition to the world outside, or to equip them with skills
and habits that will make them less likely to return to crime outside. None
of these goals is compatible with federal regulation of their wages and
hours. The reason the FLSA contains no express exception for prisoners
is probably that the idea was too outlandish to occur to anyone when the
legislation was under consideration by Congress.24
23. See generally Zatz, supra note 20. See also Danneskjold v. Hausrath, 82 F.3d 37, 44 (2d Cir.
1996) ("[P]rison labor is not in all circumstances exempt from the FLSA and that an economic reality
test is to be used in determining whether payment of FLSA wages is required.. .. We hold that prison
labor that produces goods or services for institutional needs of the prison, whether voluntary or
involuntary, inside or outside the institution, or in connection with a private employer, is not an
employment relationship within the meaning of the FLSA. Where a prisoner's work for a private
employer in the local or national economy would tend to undermine the FLSA wage scale, as in
Watson, the FLSA applies. Intermediate cases will be resolved as they arise."); McMaster v. Minnesota,
30 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that inmates assigned to work in internal prison industries
were not covered by FLSA); Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1554-56 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that
work-release inmates were employees under the FLSA and that inmate status does not automatically
prevent the FLSA from applying); Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that a
prisoner was not an "employee" under the FLSA).
24. Bennett v. Frank, 395 F.3d 409, 410 (7th Cir. 2005). See also Tourscher v. McCullough, 184
F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a pretrial detainee who performed intra-prison work was not
entitled to wage protection under the FLSA); Franks v. Oklahoma State Indus., 7 F.3d 971, 972 (10th
Cir. 1993) (holding that inmates working in prison were not FLSA employees); Harker v. State Use
Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 133 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that prisoners working in prison for state industry
were not FLSA employees); Miller v. Dukakis, 961 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that prisoners
working at unit of incarceration were not FLSA employees of unit); Wentworth v. Solem, 548 F.2d 773,
775 (8th Cir. 1977) (ruling that the FLSA did not cover convicts working in state prison industries).
2014] 517
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However, commentators and other courts have expressed skepticism
as to whether the rejection of employment regulations' applicability to
prison labor as "outlandish" is either correct in the case of FLSA, correct in
the context of other statutory schemes, or relevant to relationships that
involve private prisons.25
Regardless of whether we adopt Judge Posner's categorical approach,
viewing the Belgian-Dutch prisoner exchange through the lens of prison
labor from a U.S. perspective necessarily implicates a specific historical
and social meaning of the convict as worker. The Thirteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution explicitly exempts unpaid labor as a punishment for a
crime from the broader prohibition on slavery, 26 and the image of prison
labor-from Cool Hand Luke,27 to the "men working on the chain gang,"28
to the nameless, faceless license-plate-maker2' 9 -has become firmly
ensconced in the U.S. cultural lexicon.
25. See, e.g., Dougherty, supra note 20, at 504-07 (listing states whose workers' compensation
laws, at least in some circumstances, treat inmates as employees); Lang, supra note 20, at 197 206
(noting that, while inside prison work is not covered by the FLSA, two cases have granted FLSA
coverage to prisoner workers who contracted to do work outside prison walls); Ira P. Robbins, George
Bush's America Meets Dante's Inferno: The Americans with Disabilities Act in Prison, 15 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 49, 78-79 (1996) (noting "it is not certain" whether inmates who work in prison are
covered by the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Jackson Taylor Kirklin, Note, Title VII Protections for
Inmates: A Model Approach for Safeguarding Civil Rights in America's Prisons, Ill COLUM. L. REV.
1048, 1048 (2011) ("For nearly fifty years since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
federal courts have disagreed about whether the powerful employment protections of this Act apply to
one of the largest workforces in American society: prison inmates. Despite numerous court opinions, as
well as several investigations by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), there has
been no resolution of this issue. Depending on the circuit in which an inmate is incarcerated, prison
work may or may not be subject to Title VII coverage." (footnotes and internal quotation marks
omitted)); James J. Misrahi, Note, Factories with Fences: An Analysis of the Prison Industry
Enhancement Certification Program in Historical Perspective, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 411, 429 (1996)
("It is unclear ... whether a prison worker has the same protections against discriminatory employment
practices as a free worker. Despite the advancements in convict labor relations, many of these concerns
still need to be addressed in order to ensure that inmates will not be exploited." (internal citation
omitted)).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
27. COOL HAND LUKE (Warner Bros. 1967).
28. SAM COOKE, Chain Gang, on I FALL IN LOVE EVERY DAY (RCA Victor 1960). See also
THE BOBBY FULLER FOUR, I Fought the Law (Mustang 1965) ("Breakin' rocks in the hot sun/I fought
the law, and the law won").
29. See generally Melvin Gutterman, "Failure to Communicate": The Reel Prison Experience,
55 SMU L. REV. 1515 (2002) (discussing representations of incarceration in mass culture).
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Perhaps influenced by the Protestant Work Ethic or simply by
rehabilitationist sentiments, 30 treatments of inmates often focus on the need
for them to be engaged in productive projects."1 In 1981, before the federal
government embarked on its War on Drugs or the phrase "mass
incarceration" became a staple of law reviews or editorial pages, then Chief
Justice Warren Burger delivered a speech at the University of Nebraska
entitled "More Warehouses, or Factories with Fences," emphasizing the
industrial potential of the prison. 32 A decade later, Chief Justice Burger
hailed the possibility of "experimentation in the employment of the private
sector in promoting prison industries."33 He described a childhood visit to
the Stillwater Prison in Minnesota, during which he had been horrified, not
necessarily at the mistreatment of the prisoners, but rather at his impression
that they were being "warehoused." 34 For Chief Justice Burger, carceral
institutions that failed to put inmates to work were driving a process of
"human deterioration," leaving "the nation's wrongdoers" unproductive
and untrained.35
Chief Justice Burger's support for prison labor may have been
couched in altruistic terms,36 but the history of convicts at work in the
30. See, e.g., James Kilgore, The Myth of Prison Slave Labor Camps in the U.S.,
COUNTERPUNCH (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/08/09/the-myth-of-prison-slavc-
labor-camps-in-the-u-s/ ("[T]he shift of the prison system's emphasis from rehabilitation to punishment
in the last three decades has blocked opportunities for people to upgrade skills and education while,
incarcerated . . . . As a result purposelessncss and excruciating boredom, not overwork, are the
dominant features of most prison yards."). See generally MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND
THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans., Charles Scribner's Sons 1958) (1905) (detailing
the origins and history of the Protestant Work Ethic).
31. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 154 (Alan
Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977) (1975) (arguing that under the court-imposed "principle of non-
idleness," "it was forbidden to waste time, which was counted by God and paid for by men ... a moral
offence and economic dishonesty").




35. Id. See also Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1326 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the purposes of prison labor are to provide vocational training and improve work habits).
36. While a broader discussion of Chief Justice Burger's motives or views of the criminal justice
system is well outside of the scope of this Article, it is worth noting the absence of any discussion of re-
entry in his encomium to the socializing power of work. See Burger, supra note 32. That is, Chief
Justice Burger couches his support for the privatization and industrialization of U.S. penitentiaries in
terms of the rehabilitation or socialization (or, perhaps, disciplining) of inmates, yet he in no way
addresses the question of how prison labor might actually advance some sort of socially desirable, post-
release outcome. He mentions "literacy" as an object, but it is unclear how greater literacy will result
from a "factory" mentality. Id. In his model, is work qua work an end in itself because idle inmates
cannot be engaged in self-improvement or cannot re-enter society as functioning, law abiding
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United States hardly stands as a paragon of humanitarian treatment. While
in many ways distinct from current trends in prison labor, the U.S. practice
of leasing convicts has an ignominious history.37 For instance, during the
latter part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth
century, some states and localities in the American South allowed private
citizens to lease inmates. 38 Prisoners were then used as un-free and unpaid
laborers by the lessees, who were notorious for subjecting leased convicts
to brutal, often fatal labor conditions. 39 In 1871, the Virginia Supreme
Court firmly emphasized the link between punishment and forced labor in
Ruffin v. Commonwealth, holding that an incarcerated individual "is for the
time being a slave, in a condition of penal servitude to the State."40
Much ink has already been spilled recounting this history of inmate
labor in the U.S. context,41 so this Article will not go further over this well-
worn ground. When viewed through this lens, though, the contemporary
transnational prisoner trafficking becomes particularly striking, as it
superimposes the "peculiar institution" of un-free prison labor against not
only the racialized and deplorable practices of slave labor and convict
leasing, but also against the already troubled landscape of international
labor regulation.4 2 That is, if prisons operate-or should operate-as
individuals? Cf Christopher Angevine, The Consociative Value of Work: What Homelessness-To- Work
Programs Can Teach Us About Reforming and Expanding Prison Labor, 4 CRIM. L. BRIEF 19, 19
(2009) (arguing that "work serves as a valuable social anchor through which Americans strive to gain
not only income, but also a sense of self-worth and respect in their community"). Or is prison labor
designed to train inmates so that they might be marketable and employable upon their release? Cf id.
("Traditional rehabilitative labor programs, such as those instituted in America's first penitentiaries, are
designed to instill the 'habits' and 'virtue' necessary to make inmates better men upon their return to
free society. Vocational training programs concern themselves less with inmates' virtue, preferring
instead to focus on imparting the job skills that many prisoners lack. Modem prison labor programs,
though part and parcel of a wider rehabilitative effort, belong almost exclusively to the latter category.
No longer do prisons view work as a character changing endeavor. Instead, prisons focus their main
rehabilitative efforts in education, psychiatric and drug treatment programs. Labor is now used as a
vocational, rather than a purely rehabilitative, tool." (footnotes omitted)); Gilbreath, 931 F.2d at 1326.
37. See supra note 2.
38. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 2, at 48-52.
39. Id.
40. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 793 (1871).
41. See supra text accompanying note 20; MARY BOSWORTH, THE U.S. FEDERAL PRISON
SYSTEM 147 (2002); Steven P. Garvey, Freeing Prisoners' Labor, 50 STAN. L. REV. 339, 339 (1998)
(arguing that labor has "virtually vanished from today's prison" and should be reincorporated into the
prison regime).
42. See generally James Atleson, The Voyage of the Neptune Jade: The Perils and Promises of
Transnational Labor Solidarity, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 85 (2004) (exploring the possibility of international
labor laws); William B. Gould IV, Labor Law for a Global Economy: The Uneasy Case for
International Labor Standards, 80 NEB. L. REV. 715 (2001) (outlining debate over the proper way to
regulate labor in global markets); Katherine Van Wezcl Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four
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"factories with fences,"43 an international market in prisoners would
operate as a market for factory workers.
B. GLOBALIZING PRISON LABOR
What should we make, then, of an international market for this special
class of "factory workers"? Critics of the neoliberal globalization project
have long focused on the semi-permeable nature of borders: how the free
movement of capital is not mirrored by a free movement of labor.4 4 Indeed,
labor activists and others concerned with declining wages and working
conditions have focused on the absence of meaningful workplace
regulations and the "race to the bottom" that has defined global, post-
industrial labor markets. 4 5
When viewed in this light, a new market space in which laborers do
not even retain the modicum of self-determination generally ascribed to
market participants becomes all the more troubling.46 Examined through
Approaches to Transnational Labor Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 987 (1995) (finding the four
existing approaches to transnational labor regulation inadequate, and calling for a new model to address
obstacles to globalization).
43. Burger, supra note 32.
44. See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FREE TRADE REIMAGINED: THE WORLD
DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE METHOD OF ECONOMICS 193-98 (2007); David Graeber, The
Globalization Movement: Some Points of Clarification, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT
AND GLOBALIZATION: FROM CLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY TO CONTEMPORARY
NEOLIBERALISM 169, 169-70 (Marc Edelman & Angelique Haugerud eds., 2005); Benjamin Levin,
Made in the U.S.A.: Corporate Responsibility and Collective Identity in the American Automotive
Industry, 53 B.C. L. REV. 821, 871-74 (2012); Christopher McCrudden & Anne Davies, A Perspective
on Trade and Labor Rights, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 43, 49 (2000). Cf Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288
U.S. 517, 557-67 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (expressing concern about a race to the bottom in the
domestic context, with states providing increasingly fewer regulations and protections for public
welfare in an attempt to attract industry).
45. See, e.g., RAPHAEL KAPLINSKY, GLOBALIZATION, POVERTY, AND INEQUALITY:
BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE 163-232 (2005); Levin, supra note 44, at 871-74.
46. It is worth pausing for a moment to consider the question of "choice." It is conceivable that
the prison-labor frame (and to a lesser extent each of these suggested frames and indeed our views of
the normative desirability or acceptability of prison markets) might be complicated by the ability of
inmates to exercise some agency or to have some input in their transfer. In the Belgian case, the CPT
noted that "for the majority of inmates, including those who had arrived recently, transfer had been
affected [sic] on a non-voluntary basis," and "most of the prisoners had been notified in the morning or
the night before their transfer." CPT Report, supra note 8, at 10. The CPT therefore recommended that
notice and some input on the part of inmates should become procedural requirements of transfer. Id.
This suggestion finds purchase in recent work by Alexander Volokh suggesting the possibility of prison
vouchers-a system analogous to school vouchers whereby inmates would be able to act as consumers
in a market to obtain the optimal carceral institution. Alexander Volokh, Prison Vouchers, 160 U. PA.
L. REV. 779, 820 n.200 (2012). In Volokh's model, inmates would exercise agency in the prison
system, selecting traits that they found most appealing and helping to drive prison reform and
institutional reform from the inside. Id. Putting aside deeper discussion of Volokh's work, I note his
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the lens of prison labor, the international inmate exchange can be seen as
embodying an unholy marriage of two already questionable practices: (1)
forced labor by incarcerated individuals; and (2) largely unregulated,
undercompensated labor by individuals who are unable to equalize the
background conditions that shape the terms of their employment and their
ability to opt out.47 Individuals with no bargaining power, who are not
legally recognized as market participants, are being transported across
borders to spaces where they may be forced to perform various tasks for the
financial benefit of others. In short, we are left with what has many
properties of-or at least the makings of-a new slave trade.4 8
But should the international nature of this movement of coerced and
un- (or under-) compensated labor change our view of it or the way that we
might wish to see it regulated or legally re-conceptualized/reformed? That
is, the essential question to ask when viewing the Belgian-Dutch exchange
through this frame-as through each frame-is what (if anything) is
actually wrong with the exchange or with a market that uses this
transaction as its model? In the context of prison labor, if it is the lack of
fair contracting and wages and the inability to exert any control over one's
conditions of "employment," then this is necessarily an objection to prison
labor in general, or at least prison labor as it exists in the United States, not
just prison labor that crosses borders.
article as a means of highlighting the role of "choice" in prison reform. Arc our concerns about the
prisoner as labor or commodity or about the prison as an entrenched institution dependent on the
inability of the prisoners to behave as "rational actors?" If so, is there any way to remedy this situation,
whether through a more libertarian voucher model or a more syndicalist inmate union model? Is it even
possible to discuss choice in this context without entirely casting aside Robert Hale's concern for
"background conditions" and the illusory qualities of freedom of contract? See Robert L. Hale,
Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 474-75 (1923).
47. On background conditions of employment, see for example, Hale, supra note 467, at 474-
75; Cass R. Sunstein, Symposium on Classical Philospohy and the American Constitutional Order:
Republicanism and the Preference Problem, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 181, 194-97 (1990); CHARLES
FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 103-09 (1981).
48. The potential for such an unrestrained market and the rebirth of a quasi-slave class is
particularly noteworthy given the tendency to treat prisoners or convicted criminals as clearly other,
social outsiders defined by their deviance and lack of adherence to social mores or cultural values. See
Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and Control in the Carceral State, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 259, 294
(2011) ("if criminal offenders do bad things, it is because of who they are and what they therefore
choose to do, and no interventions, however well-meaning, can change them. And if individual actors
choose to do wrong, not only is there no help for them, but the rest of us need have no sympathy for
them, since, by their own criminal choices, they reveal themselves, like Agamben's 'wolfman,' as
beyond the required scope of moral consideration."); Benjamin Levin, De-Naturalizing Criminal Law:
Of Public Perceptions and Procedural Protections, 76 ALB. L. REv. 1777, 1783-88 (2012/13)
[hereinafter Levin, De-Naturalizing Criminal Law] (explaining the rhetorical treatment of criminals as
"other" in U.S. mass culture and political discourse).
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When we are confronted with a situation in which individuals
incapable of exercising agency are transported abroad against their will in
exchange for money and forced to perform manual labor,4 9 the slavery
analogy is a powerful one. This case provides a striking illustration, but is
the inclination to identify the labor situation across borders as worse based
on specific substantive objections? Or is the temptation to cringe at the
Belgian-Dutch exchange and the global market that it portends rooted more
in the aesthetics or cultural resonance of the situation?
Indeed, as previously discussed, not only does the U.S. Constitution
explicitly allow inmate labor,s0 but federal courts have also repeatedly
withheld protections from inmates that might have ensured that inmates
were paid decent wages or that they were not subjected to working
conditions that would be outlawed in markets outside of prison walls. 5 1 An
inmate in the United States who, like some of the Belgian inmates, 52 felt as
though she were not receiving sufficient wages, would not necessarily have
access to FLSA protections, to the right to organize or bargain collectively
under the National Labor Relations Act,53 or to invoke the assistance of the
Department of Labor or the National Labor Relations Board. Therefore, in
the case of prison labor, the fact that a work relationship is purely
"domestic" does not eliminate concerns that workers may be exposed to
unrestrained market forces or to possible abuses. 54
Notably, there may be reason to believe that inmates actually might
enjoy greater protections under international regulatory regimes than they
currently do in the United States. Worker's rights and labor activists in the
U.S. generally treat globalized labor policies with an air of skepticism, in
part because of the comparatively robust labor and employment regulations
that American workers can access at home. 5 Yet U.S. regulations and
49. That is, exercising agency once they are incarcerated. As discussed supra and infra, it may be
that we decide that individuals who have broken the law have abused their powers of agency and that,
through their misfeasance, they have forfeited any agency once they are incarcerated. Regardless of
whether we view this characterization as either descriptively accurate or normatively desirable,
however, agency is clearly lacking in the work situations of U.S. prisoners.
50. See supra note 26.
51. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
52. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
53. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2011)).
54. See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (denying inmates
rights to unionize under the NLRA because "[p]risons, it is obvious, differ in numerous respects from
free society").
55. See, e.g., Richard M. Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 215 (2007) ("Some of those features are of relatively recent
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protections have not been extended to cover inmate laborers. 56 When it
comes to international trade, such restrictions on convict labor-if
enforced-may actually have more bite. 57 Despite the free movement of
U.S. convict labor and convict-labor-produced products domestically, the
Tariff Act of 1930 specifically declares that "[a]ll goods, wares, articles,
and merchandise mined, produced or manufactured wholly or in part in any
foreign country by convict labor or/and forced labor or/and indentured
labor under penal sanctions shall not be entitled to entry at any of the ports
of the United States."58 Further, pursuant to § 307 of the Tariff Act, the
United States barred the importation of goods manufactured by convict
labor from both Mexico and China.59 Similarly, while the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and World Trade Organization
("WTO") notoriously fail to regulate labor conditions among member
nations, "[o]nly where prison labor is involved does any provision of
GATT become applicable to the WTO and its jurisdiction."6 0 In some
sense, the GATT/WTO regime operates as an inverse of the U.S. treatment
of employment: the treaties offer little to no regulation of labor conditions
outside of the carceral sphere, whereas U.S. law has constructed a web of
statutory protections for many American workers that evaporates once an
individual enters a correctional facility.
vintage, notably the multitude of changes we associate with the concept of 'globalization'-
developments with respect to labor markets, production practices, and the regulatory capacity of the
nation-state."); Stephen Franklin, AFL-CIO Jumps into Protests, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 11, 2001, available
at http://articIcs.chicagotribune.com/2001-09-I1/news/0109110233_1 afl-afl-cio-anti-globalization
(describing the AFL-CIO's rationale in joining anti-globalization protests); KAPLINSKY, supra note 45,
Pt. Ill.
56. To the extent that an inmate might be able to challenge her labor situation, based on the
current state of the law, she would probably have to resort to an Eighth Amendment claim relating to
her conditions of confinement as opposed to the statutory protections afforded to "employees."
57. See Developments in the Law-Jobs and Borders, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2202, 2211 n.41
(2005) (collecting sources providing "discussion of possible incompatibilities between U.S. law and
practice regarding prison labor and the ILO core convention on forced labor").
58. 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1997).
59. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1, 46-47 (2001) ("During the 1990s, Section 307 of the Tariff Act prohibiting the importation
of goods produced with prison or forced labor was invoked to exclude certain Mexican products. In
June 1993, the United States barred specified leather imports from China following a determination by
the U.S. Customs service that goods produced at the Qinghai Hide and Garment Factory were produced
with convict labor. In April 1996, the Customs Service again acted under Section 307 to bar importation
of certain iron pipe fittings from the Tianjin Malleable Iron Factory in China, based on a determination
that the goods were being produced with prison labor." (footnotes omitted)).
60. Gould, supra note 42, at 742 (citing General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 1887).
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If the concerns about agency and coercion outlined in this Part form
the basis of an objection to a global market in prisons, what should we
make of the fact that prison labor (or at least goods produced by inmate
laborers) is nominally regulated in the international context, but remains
largely unregulated in the domestic context? The description above of the
treatment of prison labor in international treaties and trade regulations is
not intended to suggest that the concerns outlined in this Part have been or
could be solved easily by reliance on international law or some mechanism
of global governance. Rather, these provisions are raised here as a means of
emphasizing that, from a labor perspective, a global market for prisoners
may be no more normatively problematic or theoretically flawed than the
current, domestic prison labor regime.
III. THE PRISONER AS SUBJECT: SOVEREIGNTY, CITIZENSHIP,
AND THE PURPOSES OF PUNISHMENT
Although the labor frame provides insight into the potential collateral
consequences of a market for prisoners while raising questions about U.S.
inmate labor policies, it does not explain how a market for convicts relates
to the theoretical justifications for criminal law and punishment.6 1 In order
to situate the exchange more clearly in discussions about criminalization
and the role (and effects) of incarceration, this Part considers the Belgian-
Dutch exchange through the lens of state sovereignty and representative
governance, focusing on the relationship between the governed and the
governing.
By necessity, prisoners are subject to state authority.62 To have been
sentenced to a prison term, an individual must have been under the
jurisdiction of the state authority that convicted and sentenced her.63 The
Belgian exchange essentially involved the leasing of individuals who were
61. On the relationship between the purposes of punishment and the political economy and
institutional dynamics of social control, see generally ALEXANDER, supra note 9. See also CRIME AND
DEVIANCE: ESSAYS AND INNOVATIONS OF EDWIN M. LEMERT 26-41, 61-66 (Charles C. Lemert &
Michael F. Winter eds., 2000); GARLAND, CULTURE OF CONTROL, supra note 9; HARCOURT, supra note
9; HUSAK, supra note 9; STEVEN HALL, THEORIZING CRIME & DEVIANCE: A NEW PERSPECTIVE
(2012); LACEY, supra note 9; SIMON, supra note 9; STATE, POWER, CRIME (Roy Colemanet al. eds.,
2009).
62. This portion of the Article puts aside for a moment the question of whether the theoretical
justifications for criminal (and civil) punishment remain as compelling when applied to those who arc
not formally citizens or subjects of a state (e.g., undocumented immigrants, "enemy combatants," etc.).
This issue is discussed further in Part Ill.C.2, infra.
63. This excepts those individuals in jails or incarcerated pursuant to some form of pretrial
detention where a judge or prosecutor may have yet to make a determination of the court's, arresting
officer's, or prosecutor's office's jurisdiction to detain or proceed with the case.
2014] 525
Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 23:509
incarcerated for breaking Belgian law and were under Belgian jurisdiction
to another nation, where they were subject to punishment at the hands of a
sovereign to whom they owed no allegiance, and where neither Belgian law
nor Belgians governed:
The terms of the exchange made it clear that the prison, which stands in
the territory of the Netherlands, houses prisoners sentenced by Belgian
courts in pursuance of a convention concluded on 31 October 2009
between the authorities of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and those of
the Kingdom of Belgium, on the making available of a prison in the
Netherlands for the execution of criminal sentences imposed in Belgium
under Belgian law.6
And, as described by the CPT, the prison operates as a space subject to dual
sovereign interests:
In application of the Interstate Convention, the Netherlands makes
available the prison premises and the prison and medical staff and
transfers the prisoners. Dutch criminal law is applicable within the prison.
On the other hand, all the inmates present in the prison are serving final
sentences imposed by Belgian courts, in pursuance of Belgian legislation,
and the prison regime is Belgian. All the staff working in the prison are
Dutch with the exception of the Prison Director, two Deputies and the
staff from the Penitentiary Psychosocial Service. Taking account of the
Interstate Convention, and particularly the aforementioned elements,
there is clearly shared jurisdiction where Tilburg Prison is concerned.65
That is, prison governance becomes an international hybrid, but the legal
regime itself remains decidedly Dutch.
While the CPT Report does not comment on the desirability of this
legal landscape that shifts with the inmates' forced international
migration, 66 the Report does focus on the problem of agency.67 "[F]or the
majority of inmates, including those who had arrived recently," the Report
explains, "transfer had been affected [sic] on a non-voluntary basis. The
transfer notice had, in most cases, been seen as an arbitrary decision, or
even an injustice." 68 Despite its largely uncritical tone, the CPT Report
64. CPT Report, supra note 8, at 7.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 10. Cf the discussion of agency and the hypothetical institutional remedy of
"prison vouchers" in note 46, supra.
68. CPT Report, supra note 8, at 10. It is unclear from the phrasing in the Report whether these
transfers were viewed as an injustice by the visiting delegation from the CPT or by the inmates
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does note that "as a matter of principle, a prisoner who has been sentenced
to imprisonment in one State should not, on the basis of an administrative
decision, be forced to serve the sentence in another State." 69 This single
sentence buried deep within the report is remarkable for what it does not
say and for the question it raises: what principle should prevent such
transfers from taking place? 70 This Part suggests that the principle is rooted
in the theoretical link between punishment and community, between the
state's authority to punish and its legitimacy as a governing body." Viewed
through this framework, the market in prisoners becomes a peculiar
themselves. If the former, then, as discussed in note 69, infra, this raises more troubling questions about
the Report itself and the role that it should play in legitimating the exchange.
69. Id. It is worth noting that, as discussed in supra note 46, this observation focuses less on the
problematic issue of sovereign legitimacy-the source from which the foreign state's authority to
punish and incarcerate might be derived-and instead focuses on the role of prisoner choice or agency.
The problem is not the extraterritorial punishment or the imprisonment at the hands of possibly
unaccountable jailers but rather that this all occurred "on the basis of an administrative decision." Id.
The implicit negative corollary of the CPT's observation, one might well imagine, is that, as a matter of
principle, a prisoner could be incarcerated in or punished by a foreign state if this extra-national
punishment were the product of a more deliberative decision-making process.
70. This sentence raises two other questions-less noteworthy for purposes of this Part-that
might be worth considering in assessing the normative desirability and theoretical defensibleness of a
market in prisoners. First, if the CPT stands as a sort of watchdog over the prisoner exchanges,
investigating whether they are humane and in accordance with international or national norms, then
why does the Report not make more of the fact that what is going on is unacceptable "in principle?"
Perhaps the lack of overall condemnation of the exchange is the result of realpolitik, a concession to the
political, social, and economic forces that might make nullifying the international agreement or
substantially re-shaping it impossible. Or, perhaps that this appears as just a single suggestion in an
otherwise positive Report stands as a marker of the comparatively positive situation in the prison-i.e.,
it may not be theoretically defensible, but at least the inmates are treated fairly well and are not in an
overcrowded prison. Second, is the problem, in the eyes of the CPT, actually the international nature of
the exchange at all, or is it that individual transfers might be occurring as a result of careless
bureaucratic decision-making? Is the principle that is being violated simply that prisoner transfers
should be preceded by advanced notice or some sort of more involved procedure? Cf Duncan Kennedy,
Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought 1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David Trubek & Alvarvo Santos eds., 2006) (identifying a
focus on procedural rules as a hallmark of civil libertarian, rights-based legal argumentation and
reforms).
71. In addressing the question of whether a prisoner's domicile changes when she is incarcerated
and transferred, the Sixth Circuit has articulated an analogous principle:
It makes eminent good sense to say as a matter of law that one who is in a place solely by
virtue of superior force exerted by another should not be held to have abandoned his former
domicile. The rule shields an unwilling sojourner from the loss of rights and privileges incident
to his citizenship in a particular place, such as, for example, paying resident tuition at a local
university, invoking the jurisdiction of the local divorce courts, or voting in local elections.
Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116, 1121 (6th Cir. 1973).
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exchange of sovereignty and post-democratic subjects, where one nation-
state is effectively selling its authority over its citizens.7 2
A. PUNISHMENT AND THE POLITY
Regardless of which traditional theory of punishment we might prefer,
the most commonly accepted textbook (or, for that matter, political)
justifications for criminal sanctions rely upon an explicit or implicit
baseline assumption that the polity must respond to deviant or unacceptable
behavior by its members.73 Criminal punishment, argues David Garland,
"is more than an instrument of crime control. It is also a sign that the
authorities are in control, that crime is an aberration and that the
conventions which govern social life retain their force and vitality." 74
Indeed, this particular characterization of criminal law as embodying, or at
least purporting to embody, community values and the need to eliminate
deviant behavior finds purchase throughout wide swaths of scholarship
focused on both criminology and social theory of law.75
In re-interpreting the influential criminological theories of Emile
Durkheim, Garland describes "the rituals of criminal punishment-the
72. If "to govern means to govern things," MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY,
POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE 1977-78, 97 (Graham Burchell trans., 2007),
this exchange cuts at the very heart of governance and the nature of state authority.
73. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (1789), reprinted in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 86-87 (John Bowring ed., 1962).
74. GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY, supra note I1, at 67-68 (emphasis added).
Cf Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 143 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing the rise of the
prison in the United States as a means of segregating "the 'deviant' (i.e., the criminal)" from the rest of
society).
75. See, e.g., PAUL BUTLER, LET'S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-12 (2009)
("[1]t's how all federal criminal cases are styled: the U.S. against the defendant."); HALL, supra note
61; John Pratt, Dangerousness and Modern Society, in DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: PUNISHMENT AND
SOCIAL ORDER 35, 38-47 (Mark Brown & John Pratt, eds., 2000); GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO
SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 104-05 (1998); Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal
Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 478-84 (1995); Phil Scraton &
Kathryn Chadwick, The Theoretical and Political Priorities of Critical Criminology, in THE POLITICS
OF CRIME CONTROL 161, 163-65 (Kevin Stevenson & David Cowell eds., 1991); Jean Hampton, The
Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 208, 208 (1984) (arguing that "the
moral education which punishment effects is at least part of punishment's justification"); Joel Feinberg,
The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RESPONSIBILITY 95, 98 (1970) (arguing that "punishment is a conventional device for the expression
of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation"); KAI T.
ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 13 (1966) (arguing
that "each time the community moves to censure some act of deviation, then, and convenes a formal
ceremony to deal with the responsible offender, it sharpens the authority of the violated norm and
restates where the boundaries of the group are located"); Harold Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful
Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM. J. OF SOC. 420,420-24 (1956).
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court-room trial, the passage of sentence, the execution of punishment" as
"the formalized embodiment and enactment of the conscience collective." 76
Viewed through this lens, "these procedures ... giv[e] formal expression to
the feelings of the community-and by being expressed in this way those
feelings are both strengthened and gratified."7 7 Criminal law, then, is not
simply geared toward deterring, toward rehabilitating, or toward
embodying the appropriate quantum of retributive force. Rather, it is a
collection of rituals imbued with a "didactic" quality78: "[T]he rituals of
criminal justice. . . are ceremonies which, through the manipulation of
emotion prompt particular value commitments on the part of the
participants and the audience and thus act as a kind of sentimental
education, generating and regenerating a particular mentality and particular
sensibility."79
Courts have explicitly endorsed such an understanding of criminal law
as enforcing and defending community norms and values. In United States
v. Grayson,80 the Supreme Court went so far as to quote approvingly an
article contending that "sentencing must accurately reflect the community's
attitude toward the misconduct of which the offender has been adjudged
guilty, and thereby ratify and reinforce community values."" Similarly, in
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise ),82 the Supreme
Court announced that criminal trials performed an important "community
76. GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY, supra note I1, at 67 (emphasis omitted).
Durkheim defines the "collective consciousness" as "the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to
average citizens of the same society." EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 79
(George Simpson trans., 1964).
77. GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 67. See also DURKHEIM,
supra note 76, at 58 ("As James Fitzjames Stephen once put the point: ' . . . the sentence of law is to the
moral sentiment of the public in relation to any offense what a seal is to hot wax."' (alteration in
original; footnote omitted)).
78. GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY, supra note I1, at.67.
79. Id. Garland acknowledges the limitation to this focus on the ritual in Durkheim's work, but
notes that this description is fairly accurate of the "'show-case' trials and punishments" that "tend to be
the ones which are relayed by the media to the public to represent the meaning of justice." Id. Further,
as a necessary limit on theories hinging on "collective consciousness," it is important to note that absent
complete homogeneity in a community, "there will tend to be different audiences for such public
ceremonies [of criminal punishment] and different responses" to them. Id. at 70. See also JAMES B.
ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 58 (1983) (critiquing the treatment of
law and legal decision-making as embodying "social condemnation" by arguing that: "The extent of
'social condemnation' is also not clear, and such a perception seems based on the views of only part of
the community. 'Deep-seated community sentiments' are sometimes cited to justify results that reflect
the views of only portions of the community . . . .").
80. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
81. Id. at 48 n.8 (quoting Melvin Shimm, Foreword, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 399 (1958)).
82. Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
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therapeutic" role.8 3 "Criminal acts, especially violent crimes," the Court
stated:
often provoke public concern, even outrage and hostility; this in turn
generates a community urge to retaliate and desire to have justice done.
Whether this is viewed as retribution or otherwise is irrelevant. When the
public is aware that the law is being enforced and the criminal justice
system is functioning, an outlet is provided for these understandable
reactions and emotions. Proceedings held in secret would deny this outlet
and frustrate the broad public interest; by contrast, public proceedings
vindicate the concerns of the victims and the community in knowing that
offenders are being brought to account for their criminal conduct by
jurors fairly and openly selected.84
Perhaps even more strikingly, the Fourth Circuit, in United States v.
Bakker,85
recognize[d] that a sentencing court can consider the impact a defendant's
crimes have had on a community, and can vindicate that community's
interests in justice. To a considerable extent, a sentencing judge is the
embodiment of public condemnation and social outrage. As the
community's spokesperson, a judge can lecture a defendant both as a
lesson to that defendant and as a deterrent to others."
The criminal trial, the conviction, and the sentencing, then, become spaces
of great import to the community-spaces where values are affirmed and
the legitimacy of the state, the law, and the criminal justice system are
affirmed by the ritual of punishment.8 7
83. Id. at 508 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570 (1980)).
84. Id. at 509.
85. United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991).
86. Id. at 740 (citations omitted). See also United States v. Madison, 689 F.2d 1300, 1314-15
(7th Cir. 1982) ("In order to render justice to all the judge must be able to impress upon a defendant
through the expansive contents of an all encompassing presentence report that we are a country of laws
and not men. The criminal must learn that with every cherished right he enjoys he also assumes a
corresponding obligation to live according to the law of the land. Our laws are for the protection of all
mankind and not just the criminal."). In vacating the defendant's sentence, however, the court in Bakker
noted that it could not "sanction sentencing procedures that create the perception of the bench as a
pulpit from which judges announce their personal sense of religiosity and simultaneously punish
defendants for offending it." Bakker, 925 F.2d at 740.
87. See GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 67.
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None of this is meant to downplay the real-world, concrete effects of
criminal law." That the crafting of criminal statutes or handling of criminal
cases may have a powerful expressive,89 didactic, or legitimating90 function
certainly does not alter the fact that at the end of a criminal prosecution, a
defendant may be incarcerated or executed. 91 Rather, I highlight this
underlying moral or community-based quality of criminal law because of
the severity of criminal sanctions. In order for the state to deprive an
individual of her liberty (or her life), the state must possess some authority
to exercise legal and physical violence. As a result, the rhetorical or
discursive identification of criminal law as reflective of collective
consciousness becomes particularly powerful as a means of legitimating
and authorizing the exceptional show of state violence. Further, much as
the CPT Report expresses skepticism towards the alteration of a prisoner's
88. See Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) (arguing that legal
interpretation is not merely an academic exercise and cannot be divorced from the realities of legal
violence).
89. See Dan Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 414 (1999)
(examining the "expressive" function of law).
90. On the legitimating function of law, see, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF
CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 347 (1998) ("[T]he legal system creates as well as reflects consensus (this
is true both of legislation and of adjudication). Its institutional mechanism 'legitimates,' in the sense of
exercising normative force on the citizenry."); RAYMOND GEUSS, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY:
HABERMAS AND THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL 59 (1981) ("To say that the members of the society take a
basic social institution to be 'legitimate' is to say that they take it to 'follow' from a system of norms
they all accept[,] . . . a set of general beliefs (normative beliefs and other kinds of beliefs) which are
organized into a world-picture which they assume all members of the society hold. So a social
institution is considered legitimate if it can be shown to stand in the right relation to the basic world-
picture of the group.")); Peter Gabel, The Mass Psychology of the New Federalism: How the Burger
Court's Political Imagery Legitimizes the Privatization of Everyday Life, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 263,
269-70 (1984) (discussing the way that judicial opinions attempt to ascribe a broader ideology to the
nation, effectively creating an artificial "we" and then purporting to speak for it); Benjamin Levin,
American Gangsters: RICO, Criminal Syndicates, and Conspiracy Law as Market Control, 48 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105 (2013) [hereinafter Levin, American Gangsters] (exploring the legitimating
functions of the criminal law, specifically related to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO)); Benjamin Levin, Blue-Collar Crime: Conspiracy, Organized Labor, and
the Anti-Union Civil RICO Claim, 75 ALB. L. REV. 559 (2011/12) (exploring the legitimating and
cultural functions of the criminal law, specifically related to RICO); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital
Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REv. 355, 429-32 (1995) (examining the legitimating function of Supreme
Court death penalty jurisprudence); David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and
Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575, 589-90 (1984) ("American labor law ... [is] the embodiment of a
'moral and political vision,' which contains a 'powerfully integrated set of beliefs, values, and political
assumptions' (i.e., a world view) and which serves as a 'legitimating ideology' that reinforces the
dominant institutions and hegemonic culture of our society.") (citation omitted); Tom R. Tyler,
Psychological Perspective on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 575 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375 (2006)
(describing legitimacy in various contexts, including legal systems).
91. See Cover, supra note 88, at 1618-22.
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conditions and place of confinement because of a mere "administrative
decision," 92 we expect, or at least hope, that criminal punishment results
from a grave breach of important societal proscriptions and is reserved for
those truly deserving of at least some degree of moral opprobrium. Once
again, the suggestion that criminal law stands as both an aspirational and
descriptive embodiment of community values becomes a critical means for
the polity to justify how and why the state can and should exercise punitive
force.
What happens, then, when a different polity is responsible for
punishing another society's deviants? Assuming for argument's sake that it
is fair to consider a state as representative of the nation, polity, or
population that it governs,93 punished citizens transported to another nation
cease to be punished by their state and according to (what at least purport
to be) their community values. 94 The initial rituals of punishment-the
pretrial appearances, the trial, and the sentencing-may have occurred in
the nation whose law was broken. But the final, lasting ritual-the
punishment itself-has been exported. If the law in a democratic society
purports to represent a codification of popular values, norms, or
aspirations, 95 how is it appropriate for a different polity with potentially
different values, norms, and aspirations to be responsible for enacting this
socializing discipline, this ultimate ritual?
B. WHICH VALUES? AND WHOSE COMMUNITY?
The question of transporting the locus of punishment across borders
raises some highly troubling hypotheticals. Imagine that Nation A does not
prohibit the use or sale of cocaine, and, indeed, cocaine is a commonly
used narcotic in Nation A. On the other hand, Nation B imposes strict
prison sentences for the possession of even small amounts of cocaine. Now
imagine that Bob, a citizen of Nation B, is convicted of cocaine possession
92. CPT Report, supra note 8, at 10.
93. Cf FERNANDO ENRIQUE CARDOSO & ENZo FALETTO, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT
IN LATIN AMERICA 208 (Marjory Mattingly Urquidi trans., 1979) (discussing the distinction between
"nation" and "state" as the potential for a structurally ensconced disconnect between the interests of the
ruling elite and the populace).
94. See supra note 79.
95. See DURKHEIM, supra note 76, at 44; FOUCAULT, supra note 72, at 56-57 (suggesting that
"the law [purportedly] refers to a norm, and that the role and function of the law therefore-the very
operation of the law-is to codify a norm, to carry out a codification in relation to the norm"); Cf
Donald Braman et al., Some Realism About Punishment Naturalism, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1531 (2010)
(discussing the absence of universal norms in determining what behavior to punish and how severely to
punish it).
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in his home country, but is shipped to a prison in Nation A. The guards in
the Nation A prison are frequent cocaine users, and the citizenry of Nation
A engages with impunity in the same behavior for which Bob is
incarcerated. In short, the punishers (i.e., the jailers and those responsible
for prison governance) are presumably not punishing out of any concern for
their own community, its safety, or its values. 96 Rather, they are punishing
because it is their job, because they are being paid to extract another
polity's vengeance or act out another polity's moral condenmation.9 ' Bob is
certainly being punished; his incarceration has caused him to lose liberties
and privileges associated with citizenship and even basic freedoms of
mobility. The ritual that Durkheim and others identified as critical to the
process of criminal law is being performed, 98 but Nation B does not have to
confront the ugly realities (aside from the cost) of Bob's incarceration.
Further, it is a stretch to suggest that he is being socialized to renounce his
behavior as deviant and unacceptable while being governed or incarcerated
by individuals who do not view his conduct as such.
Perhaps even more troubling is the question of conditions of
confinement. Now, imagine that Nation B has very strict restrictions on the
use of corporal punishment or on the treatment of prisoners, whereas
Nation A does not and generally grants its corrections officers free reign to
supervise and treat prisoners as they see fit.99 Had Bob been incarcerated in
96. It is conceivable that citizens of Nation A would see some inherent good or national interest
in the punishment of Bob, even if he were being punished for behavior that was lawful in Nation A.
Perhaps, for instance, such punishment furthers global interests in rule of law. The citizens of Nation A
and Nation B may disagree about what constitutes lawful behavior, but they can all agree that obeying
the law is important. Such an understanding of the shared interest in rule of law might be seen as at least
a partial justification for extradition policies or expansive, international jurisdictional reach.
97. But see supra note 96.
98. See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
99. Such a hypothetical finds purchase in the suggestion by British Member of Parliament Ian
Austin, that Britain should conduct an inmate exchange like the Belgian-Dutch one with Poland or
another Eastern European nation with a reputation for harsh or inhumane prison management. See
Moss, supra note 1. This concern has also been raised regarding the U.S. treatment of suspects during
the War on Terror via the process of "extraordinary rendition." See James J. Saulino, Strategic Choices:
Four Legal Models for Counterterrorism in Pakistan, 2 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 247, 267-68 (2011).
"An extraordinary rendition involves no cooperation from, and possibly no prior notification to, the
government where the suspect is located. It amounts to a forcible abduction of an individual inside the
sovereign territory of another state, followed by the delivery of that individual back to the United
States, or into a third country's custody." Id. at 267 (footnotes omitted). During the presidency of
George W. Bush, allegations swirled in the media that the United States was rendering prisoners to
nations in which it would be easier for investigators to resort to torture. Id.; Douglas Jehl & David
Johnston, Rule Change Lets CI.A. Freely Send Suspects Abroad to Jails, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/06/politics/06intel.html?pagewanted=1& r-2; Charlie Savage,
Obama's War on Terror May Resemble Bush's in Some Areas, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2009),
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a Nation B prison and been subjected to abuse, he might have: (1) sought to
contact his elected representatives in B; (2) joined family, friends, or fellow
inmates in advocating for policy change in Nation B; or (3) brought suit in
a Nation B court.100 While Bob might not be legally knowledgeable or
savvy about his rights or his ability to bring suit,"o" it is possible that a
friend or family member might have some baseline familiarity with the
legal system or be able to contact a lawyer.
In Nation A, however, it is unclear whether any of these possible
remedial paths might be available to Bob. Certainly, we could imagine that
the treaty or contractual terms that formed the framework for a market in
prisoners could provide for the conditions of confinement, but this would
entail international agreements and would not be easily resolved by
referring to domestic constitutional or statutory protections. In short, it is
unclear how such a system would clearly ensure accountability in the
proper or humane maintenance of a prison system. 102 While both nations
might be signatories to an agreement on the humane treatment of prisoners,
whether Bob would have legal recourse if the international treaty terms
were violated would remain a live question, perhaps dependent on the laws
of the place of incarceration (and the terms of the treaty). Similarly, even if
an international treaty established a baseline for the treatment of prisoners,
this would not necessarily guarantee that Nation A's standards would be as
high as those of Nation B.103 Finally, where the lack of familiarity with the
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/us/politics/18policy.html?pagewanted=all; Chris Jenks & Eric
Talbot Jensen, All Human Rights Are Equal, But Some Are More Equal Than Others: The
Extraordinary Rendition of a Terror Suspect in Italy, the NATO SOFA, and Human Rights, I HARV.
NAT'L SEC. J. 171 (2010); Erik Luna, The Bin Laden Exception, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 230,
232 (2012); Erik Luna, Criminal Justice and the Public Imagination, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 105-
09 (2009); Francesco Messinco, The Abu Omar Case in Italy: "Extraordinary Renditions" and State
Obligations to Criminalize and Prosecute Torture under the UN Torture Convention, 7 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 1023, 1023-24 (2009).
100. Assuming, of course, that Nation B law at least loosely mirrored U.S. domestic law regarding
conditions of confinement and inmate civil rights litigation.
101. U.S. courts generally acknowledge pro se inmates' lack of familiarity with the legal system
and accordingly construe their pleadings liberally or afford them some degree of special solicitude in
the interests of justice. See, e.g., Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2010) ("It is well
established that a court is ordinarily obligated to afford a special solicitude to pro se litigants.") (citing,
inter alia, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009);
Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008).
102. In the Belgian-Dutch exchange, this concern appears to be less of an issue than it might be in
other hypothetical exchanges. As previously noted, human rights inquiries have revealed no evidence of
abuse and even some positive prisoner responses, and the Netherlands is not notorious for atypically
harsh prison conditions.
103. It, of course, might be that Nation A's standards for prisoner treatment were higher than
those of Nation B.
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legal system might certainly serve as a barrier to justice if Bob were
incarcerated in Nation B,104 the possibility that he might overcome this
hurdle when faced with a foreign legal order (and perhaps a different
official language) in Nation A appears even less likely.
C. DOMESTIC ANALOGS
As with the prison labor framework, however, this institutional
perspective raises the question of exceptionality: if there is something
wrong with the global prison market or the international exchange of
inmates, is it actually unique to this method of exchange, or can the
problem be identified in domestic carceral spaces? Are the concerns about
representativeness, community, and sovereign authority that underlie the
exchange of prisoners across national borders absent when we consider the
ways in which the U.S. prison system operates? As in the context of prison
labor,105 this Article argues that the problems encountered in examining the
global prison market are really just more noticeable, unfamiliar, or perhaps
egregious versions of the same practices that plague U.S. penal policies.
1. Felon Disenfranchisement
First, widespread disenfranchisement of felons in the United States
has already raised the specter of punishing individuals who have no
democratic recourse and no means of exercising agency over the
mechanisms and institutions responsible for their punishment.' 06 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the right to
vote as fundamental to the preservation and exercise of other civil rights. 0 7
In Reynolds v. Sims, 08 the Court stated:
104. See supra note 100.
105. See supra Part II.B.
106. See Scott M. Bennett, Note, Giving Ex-Felons the Right to Vote, 6 CAL. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 1
(2004) ("All but two states punish convicted felons by taking away their right to vote, either for a
limited period or for the rest of their lives. As a result, 3.9 million adult Americans-about 2 percent of
the voting-age population-have lost their right to participate in a fundamental part of the political
process. The racial impact of these laws is even more staggering: 13 percent of black men in America
cannot vote because of a felony conviction."); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 41-53 (1974)
(discussing Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment's allowance of vote denial based on a felony
conviction); Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation and the Debate
over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1155 (2004).
107. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (referring to "the political franchise
of voting" as "a fundamental political right, because it is preservative of all rights"); infra note 106 and
accompanying text.
108. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and
democratic society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in
a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and
political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote
must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.'"
Despite this proclamation of the importance of electoral democracy and the
threat of strict scrutiny," 0 the Court continues to recognize the right of
states to disenfranchise felons.' Indeed, as of 2002, forty-eight states
practiced some form of felon disenfranchisement."12
If individuals convicted of certain crimes are stripped of a
fundamental right that is "preservative of other basic civil and political
rights,"l3 then they also necessarily occupy a tenuous relationship to the
rest of the polity. Assuming that former felons' ability to vote stands as the
epitome of their ability to participate in democratic self-governance, then
without the ability to vote, they are no longer engaged (and may no longer
engage) in the act of shared self-sovereignty that grants legitimacy to the
state. If, as discussed at length previously," 4 the legitimacy and
significance of criminal punishment are wrapped up in shared values and
the preservation of a given community (and the state's authority over the
community),"' then what does it mean when those who have been
punished cease to be a part of that community and become incapable of
formally expressing their values, commitments, and preferences?
Perhaps this can be viewed as a societal judgment that the polity
should operate on a "one-strike" basis: when an individual commits a
sufficiently serious crime, she has forfeited her full membership in the
polity." 6 Even aside from the troubling race and class-based implications
109. Id. at 561-62.
110. See id. at 561-62; David Zctlin-Jones, Note, Right to Remain Silent: What the Voting Rights
Act Can and Should Say About Felony Disenfranchisement, 47 B.C. L. REV. 411,417 (2006).
111. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974); Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117,
119 (M.D. N.C. 1972), affid, 411 U.S. 961 (1973); Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.
Fla.), aff'd, 396 U.S. 12 (1969); Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451-52 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968).
112. Developments in the Law--The Law of Prisons: One Person, No Vote: The Laws of Felony
Disenfranchisement, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1939, 1942 (2002); Zetlin-Jones, supra note I10, at 412.
113. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-62.
114. See supra notes 75-87, 98, and accompanying text.
115. See GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 11, at 67 (arguing that
criminal punishment and public rituals of criminal punishment operate as "a sign that the authorities are
in control").
116. This rule finds purchase in Ruffin, the Reconstruction-era Virginia case, in which the court
stated, "The bill of rights is a declaration of general principles to govern a society of freemen, and not
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of such a rule,' "7 the immediate disenfranchisement of felons flies in the
face of purported goals of rehabilitation and socialization. If a society
concludes that voting is the essential empowering right of citizenship and
then denies it to felons, there is no way that rehabilitation and socialization
can be complete. The prisoner can never be welcomed back into the polity
as a full citizen.
If one of the more disturbing components of Bob's hypothetical plight
was his inability to exercise political voice through the electoral process," 8
then what makes Bob different from the millions of felons in the United
States who have been stripped of this privilege?"'9 If ours is a system that
views felons as having forfeited the critical rights of citizenship and
political participation due to her criminal conduct, then the same
disenfranchisement and alienation from self-governance that an
international market portends is already in full effect in the United States
and has already received U.S. judicial approval.120
2. Domestic Prisoner Transfers
Similarly, the widespread movement of federal prisoners throughout
the United States, and the interstate 21-and even intrastate-movement of
state prisoners, raise similar questions about whether the prisoners are
being punished according to the standards of their "community" or are even
within the same political unit whose inhabitants they were incarcerated for
endangering. That is, the distinction based simply on the logistics of
movement between a global market in prisoners, wherein inmates are
shipped across borders, and a domestic carceral system, which purports to
incarcerate inmates in the place where they committed a crime, may be
largely illusory given the way that domestic prison transfers currently
operate.
of convicted felons and men civilly dead. Such men have some rights it is true, such as the law in its
benignity accords to them, but not the rights of freemen. They are the slaves of the State undergoing
punishment for heinous crimes committed against the laws of the land. While in this state of penal
servitude, they must be subject to the regulations of the institution of which they are inmates, and the
laws of the State to whom their service is due in expiation of their crimes." Ruffin v. Commonwealth,
62 Va. 790, 796 (1871).
117. See ALEXANDER, supra note 9, at 139.
118. See supra Part III.B.
119. See Bennet, supra note 106, at 1.
120. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974).
121. See Hunter, supra note 16, at 329-41 (detailing the development of the right to transfer
federal prisoners and State of Alaska prisoners).
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In Meachum v. Fano,122 the Supreme Court declined to bar the
involuntary intrastate transfer of prisoners, holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not, by itself, "create a liberty interest in prisoners to be
free from intrastate prison transfers."l 23  Subsequently, in Olim v.
Wakinekona,124 the Court extended this rationale to situations in which
states prisoners were transferred across state lines to facilities in other
states125: "Just as an inmate has no justifiable expectation that he will be
incarcerated in any particular prison within a State, he has no justifiable
expectation that he will be incarcerated in any particular State."l 26 Further,
this rationale has been extended to apply to federal prisoners transported
from state to state. 127
While it is tempting to focus on the interstate/intrastate distinction in
comparing the Belgian-Dutch exchange with quotidian, domestic prison
transfers, such a distinction may overvalue borders and undervalue cultural
and legal differences within political units (either states or nation-states).
On the one hand, Belgium and the Netherlands may share certain cultural
and legal values,128 rendering a transfer of prisoners between the two
122. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
123. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478 (1995) (citing Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225). The Court
narrowed this holding in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22
(1990); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489 (1980). It then returned to a broader reading of Meachum in
Sandin. See 515 U.S. at 483-84; Donna H. Lee, The Law of Typicality: Examining the Procedural Due
Process Implications of Sandin v. Conner, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 785, 794-97 (2004); Philip W.
Sbaratta, Note, Sandin v. Conner: The Supreme Court's Narrowing of Prisoners' Due Process and the
Missed Opportunity to Discover True Liberty, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 744, 753-54 (1996).
124. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (2003).
125. Id. at 245.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Burke v. Romine, 85 F. App'x 274, *10- 11 (3d Cir. 2003) ("There is no reason to
apply a different rule to the transfer of a prisoner from one location to another within the federal system.
Although we sympathize with Burke's desire to be imprisoned where he can remain in contact with his
family, the transfer of a prisoner for reasons related to a legitimate penological interest is a matter
within the discretion of the prison authorities. Burke has no constitutional basis on which to ground his
lawsuit."); Tighe v. Wall, 100 F.3d 41, 42 (5th Cir. 1996) ("A prisoner has no constitutionally protected
interest in a particular facility.").
128. From 1815 until 1830, Belgium was a part of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands. See
Rick Torfs, Church and State in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands: Unexpected Similarities and
Hidden Differences, 1996 B.Y.U.L. REV. 945, 946 (1996). While the two nations certainly have
significant legal and cultural differences, id. at 947, they are party to a number of treaties that have
harmonized legal regimes in both countries, and they also share a number of legal and cultural
similarities. See, e.g., Sonia Bychkov Green, Currency of Love: Customary International Law and the
Battle for Same-Sex Marriage in the United States, 14 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 53, 90 (2011)
(noting that Belgium and the Netherlands had both legalized same-sex marriage); Peter W. Schroth &
Ana Daniela Bostan, International Constitutional Law and Anti-Corruption Measures in the European
Union's Accession Negotiations: Romania in Comparative Perspective, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 625, 639
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nations less explicitly problematic when viewed through the lenses
discussed in this Article than other hypothetical international exchanges.
On the other hand, a nation as massive and diverse as the United States
contains countless political, legal, and social divisions that might make a
transfer across state lines even more pronounced than one across national
borders. 129 Similarly, even the transfer of prisoners within a single state
may well entail substantial transitions in social and cultural norms.
In New York, for example, a large number of state prisons are located
in less populous, rural or semi-rural upstate communities, 130 where a large
number of inmates who lived in the New York City metropolitan area prior
to their incarceration are confined as punishment for crimes committed
downstate. 131 According to a 2002 study by the Prison Policy Initiative,
approximately 44,000 state prisoners (two-thirds of the entire state prison
population) are from New York City.132 However, a mere 3,000 of these
New York City based inmates were incarcerated in state-run jails located in
New York City.133
Further, given the racial demographics of New York, the outcome of
these prison arrangements is that many people of color from either largely
non-white or ethnically diverse urban communities end up incarcerated in
largely white, rural, or exurban communities.1 34 While the same state laws
may govern Harlem and Malone, New York,135 are we really comfortable
(2004); Tracy A. Kaye, European Tax Harmonization and the Implications for U.S. Tax Policy, 19 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 109, 128-29 (1996) (discussing the terms of a tax treaty between the nations).
But cf GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN WORK-
RELATED VALUES 228 (1984) (stating that Belgium and the Netherlands have substantial cultural
differences).
129. Such an observation does not, of course, vitiate the important issues relating to jurisdiction
and political and legal agency that an international exchange implicates and that might make such an
exchange substantially different in effect than a domestic transfer.
130. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 16; Andrew Beveridge, Imprisoned in New York, THE GOTHAM
GAZETTE (Feb. 19, 2004), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/demographics/2317-imprisoned-
in-new-york; Peter Wagner, Importing Constituents: Prisoners and Political Clout in New York,
PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE REPORT (Apr. 22, 2002),
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/importing/importing.html# ftnrefl; Nonprofit Voter Engagement
Network, About the Census: Prison Inmates Redistricting and the 2010 Census (2011), available at
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/Counting-Prison-Inmates.pdf.
131. See, e.g., Beveridge, supra note 130; Wagner, supra note 130.
132. Beveridge, supra note 130; Wagner, supra note 130.
133. Beveridge, supra note 130; Wagner, supra note 130.
134. See Wagner, supra note 130 ("The majority of New York's prisoners are urban and non-
white, but the majority of New York's 70 prisons are in predominately white, rural areas.").
135. Malone, a town near the Canadian border, is home to the maximum security Upstate
Correctional Facility. See N.Y. State Dep't of Corrections & Community Supervision, Department of
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treating these spaces as the same community?'3 6 Put another way, voters in
Malone and Harlem may vote in the same gubernatorial election and may
be governed by the same state and federal constitutions, 13 7 but is the
transfer of a young black man convicted of drug trafficking in Harlem to a
prison in Malone immune from the concerns that might weigh against
expansion of the Belgian-Dutch exchange?
In terms of conditions of confinement, the mobility of prisoners within
the federal system may also raise important concerns about the
constitutional protections that purport to maintain a shared set of
assumptions about humane punishment.'38 While in theory there may be
only one body of constitutional law, in practice, courts diverge as to the
constitutionality of an inmate's housing conditions, the sufficiency of
prison disciplinary procedure, or the definition of abusive conduct by a
corrections officer and ultimately when such conduct is so egregious as to
preclude qualified immunity.139 Prison litigation is often fact-intensive,
Corrections and Community Supervision Facility Listing (last visited Feb. 18, 2014),
http://www.doccs.ny.gov/faclist.html.
136. Such a question is beyond the scope of this Article and raises numerous legal and political
questions regarding vote apportionment and the basic composition and continued political feasibility of
many states given demographic migrations and economic distributions. Without entering into broader
discussion of the normative desirability of further subdividing states as political units, I raise this
question here in light of the theoretical grounding of criminal law and criminal punishment in
conceptions of the community and the collective consciousness. See GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND
MODERN SOCIETY, supra note I1, at 67. See generally DURKHEIM, supra note 76. Because of this
strong theoretical link between social norms and criminal law, Levin, De-Naturalizing Criminal Law,
supra note 48, at 1789-90, the potential for heterogeneity within political units and communities
becomes critical to our understanding of what punishments "the community" requires and what
punishments are actually normatively required to achieve such ends, cf supra note 79 (discussing the
underappreciated role of fractiousness within the "collective consciousness").
137. While a discussion of the practice of "prison-based gerrymandering" falls outside of the
scope of this Article, it is worth noting that these transfers and the incarceration of prisoners many miles
from their homes and from the location of their transgressions has raised serious issues relating to the
counting of populations for voting purposes. See generally Wagner, supra note 130; Criminal Justice
Fact Sheets: Prison Gerrymandering, PRISON POL'Y INITIATIVE, available at
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/factsheets.html#Prison-BasedGerrymandering (last visited July 18,
2013). Not only might a prisoner be incarcerated in a community much different from her own, but her
presence in the new community might strengthen its legislative clout. Wagner, supra note 130. That is,
"[b]y crediting rural prison towns with urban prisoners, the New York Legislature is helping to
postpone, for at least another decade, a democratic debate over the best way to address crime, drugs and
unemployment. . . . In essence, these rural whites will be able to 'speak for' the incarcerated urban
prisoners in ways counter to their interests." Id.
138. See Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("It is cruel
conditions, defined by reference to community norms, to which the Constitution speaks.").
139. See, e.g., Jordan v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 191 F. App'x 639, 650-51 (10th Cir. 2006)
("When considering whether the conditions, duration or restrictions of confinement are atypical as
compared with other inmates, this court has inconsistently used comparisons either with inmates in the
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requiring courts to assess whether the amount of force an inmate is
subjected to or the conditions in which she is housed rise above the level of
unpleasantries to the realm of constitutional injuries.14 0 Such decision-
making, therefore, tends to be less suited to broadly applicable or
categorical rules, allowing for great variation across courts as to what
claims might give rise to a suit that would survive a motion to dismiss or
for summary judgment.
The mutability and uncertainty of constitutional protections is
highlighted by the fact that an inmate transferred from, say, New York to
Wyoming, may become the migratory victim of a circuit split.141 That is, a
federal inmate might bring suit to vindicate her rights under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents142 in the U.S. District Court for Wyoming just as
she would have in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New
same segregation or those in the general prison population. The Supreme Court has recognized, without
deciding the issue, that the circuit courts are split on which baseline comparison to use. In this circuit,
regardless of which baseline we have utilized, this court 'has never held the conditions, duration or
restrictions of the detentions presented on appeal created a liberty interest . . . .' Similarly, the majority
of other circuits have also held no liberty interest arose in administrative detentions presented on
appeal, while a few others have rendered contrary decisions. Admittedly, none of these cases involved a
detention lasting almost five years or 1,825 days. Nonetheless, we generally rely on their rudimentary
principles and discussion to assist in our analysis of the issues presented in this case." (citations
omitted)); McLaurin v. Morton, 48 F.3d 944, 949 (6th Cir. 1995) ("Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claim
remains pending before the District Court. The dissent raises an important issue on which the circuits
are split. There are two competing interests here. Granting qualified immunity on only one of the claims
may reduce discovery but it does not eliminate it. Additionally, defendant will nonetheless be exposed
to trial, albeit a more limited one. Thus, an immediate appeal of less than all claims does not afford
defendant complete relief. To the extent that it affords a defendant relief, the purpose recognized [by the
Supreme Court] of relieving public officials from the cost of litigation is advanced. However, since
there is still discovery and trial of the remaining issues, the value of the final judgment rule is lost."
(citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)); Schrob v. Catterson, 967 F.2d 929, 939 (3d Cir.
1992)).
140. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (conditions of confinement, "alone,
or in combination, may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities"); Jordan,
191 F. App'x at 650-51; Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1316 (10th Cir. 2002) (analyzing
medical symptoms in the context of an Eighth Amendment claim); Union Cnty. Jail Inmates v.
DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984, 999 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984) ("The totality of
circumstances relevant to this [Eighth Amendment] inquiry comprises all those circumstances that bear
on the nature of the [food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, or protection] afforded to
sentenced inmates."); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2453 n.245
(2003) (discussing the administrative exhaustion requirement in prison litigation cases as responsive to
the "fact-intensive" nature of such cases).
141. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005) (noting a circuit split on the characteristics of
confinement that amounted to a constitutional violation). See also Wagner, supra note 130.
142. 403 U.S. 388, 389, 397 (1971) (holding that an arrestee could bring suit and recover
damages for a Fourth Amendment violation by federal agents).
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York. 143 However, it is possible that the Second and Tenth Circuits will
have differing interpretations of the constitutional rights the prisoner might
seek to vindicate, yielding substantially different outcomes in each place of
incarceration."
Further, the change in demographics that results from both interstate
and intrastate prisoner transfers necessarily affects the composition of jury
pools for prisoners' civil rights cases. Even if an inmate's claim regarding
the conditions of confinement or the use of force by a correctional officer
survives motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, she still must face
a jury composed not of members of her community, 14 5 but of members of
the prison's community. Much as the upstate New York prison guard may
come from a culture and community very different from those of the
downstate inmate, so too might the upstate jury, which consequently may
view with suspicion people who look, act, sound, and live the way that the
downstate inmate-plaintiff does. Additionally, particularly in rural
communities that rely on prisons for much of their local economies, 146 jury
pools may abound with the children, spouses, friends, and acquaintances of
prison guards. A Dutch court might well be more sympathetic toward a
Dutch guard than a Belgian inmate; similarly, an upstate jury may have
much more in common with an upstate correctional officer than a
downstate (or out-of-state) inmate.
In short, if the peculiarity of the global prison market or prison
exchange system causes us to revert to aspirational statements about how a
properly functioning or just carceral system operates, it should also force us
to confront the glaring absence of these same aspirational or normative
commitments from current practices in the U.S. criminal justice system. If
we fear the creation of transient inmate populations, unmoored from their
communities, and the socio-legal spaces that deemed them worthy of
punishment, we must address the way in which these same dynamics are at
143. Bivens has fallen into disfavor in the decades following its introduction, yet it remains the
basis under which a federal prisoner may attempt to bring a constitutional claim against federal prison
staff. See, e.g., Corr. Scrvs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Bivens is
a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action-
decreeing them to be 'implied' by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional prohibition"). See
generally T. Ward Frampton, Bivens's Revisions: Constitutional Torts After Minneci v. Pollard, 100
CAL. L. REV. 1711 (2012) (describing the manner in which courts have modified Bivens over the past
few decades).
144. See, e.g., supra notes 139, 141.
145. That is, the community in which she originally committed an offense and was charged.
146. See, e.g., Beveridge, supra note 130; Wagner, supra note 130.
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play in domestic transfers lacking the fanfare or intrigue of an international
treaty.
IV. THE PRISONER AS RESOURCE: INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
A POST-INDUSTRIAL MOMENT
Up to this point, my discussion of markets in prisoners has focused
primarily on the prisoners themselves and the potential harms visited upon
them by a market that ships them across borders, or even by domestic
transfers that dislocate them from their communities. This Part, however,
shifts focus from the prisoner and her role in this market to the prison and
the prison employees. Given that this Article aims to examine a specific
market, it is important to consider what forces are actually driving this
market, what conditions brought about the Belgian-Dutch exchange, what
conditions might cause this market to expand, and whether these forces are
reflective of or reflected in domestic prisoner transfers.
A. MARKET FORCES RATHER THAN THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT
By all accounts, the drivers of the Belgian-Dutch exchange were an
excess of prisoners and an excess of prisons. In his discussion, Kontorovich
framed the exchange as dictated by principles of efficiency.14 7 Each nation
exploited its comparative advantage1 48: Belgium as producer of prisoners
and consumer of prison services, and the Netherlands as consumer of
prisoners and provider of prison services. 14 9 Putting aside other logistical,
legal, and theoretical concerns,150 the Belgian-Dutch exchange would not
have been possible absent the Netherlands' surplus of prisons.' 5 ' This is not
to discount the two prior frames as critical to our understanding of the
potential consequences of a global market in prisoners or of such a
market's similarities to U.S. penal policies. Rather, acknowledging the
stated drivers of the exchange suggests that the frames discussed in the
147. See Kontorovich, supra note 4.
148. See, e.g., David Ricardo, On The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation 133-34 (3rd
ed. 1821), reprinted in THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO 133-34 (Piero
Sraffa ed., 1951); Michael H. Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence of Free
Trade Practice, Global Economics and Their Governing Principles of Political Economy, 69 U. MO.-
KAN C.L. REV. 733, 750-56 (2001).
149. Kontorovich situates this exchange in the context of international prosecutions for privacy,
contending that this is endemic of a positive trend in seeking the "cheapest justice provider." See
Kontorovich, supra note 4 ("Sending prisoners to the cheapest justice provider really went global in the
past few years with Somali piracy.").
150. See supra Parts II-IlI.
151. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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prior Parts illustrate side effects, but not the impetus for the exchange and
the nascent market that it may portend.
A market for inmates based on the availability of unpaid or underpaid
labor or the need to incapacitate a growing universe of social deviants
conceivably might exist primarily due to the epidemic of mass
incarceration, 152 but until now the functionality of such a market has been
premised on the availability of unused prison space.' 1 3 Indeed, the CPT
Report contains no suggestion that the Belgian prisoners were subjected to
unusually harsh labor conditions and no facts to support a conclusion that
harnessing inmates' low-skill labor was a tacit driver of the exchange. 154
On the contrary, the Report explicitly states that transferred inmates were
upset at being denied the opportunity to work as many hours as they had
worked in Dutch penal facilities.1 55
Certainly, the convict leasing comparison discussed above is an
interesting one that raises numerous questions about the necessity of
regulating the usage or treatment of inmates in their host nation or
institution. 15 6 But it is also important to note a distinction central to this
Article and its project of understanding contemporary markets in forced
migration of inmates: the prisoners may be useful as labor, but the Belgian
exchange, at least on its face, was not designed to secure inexpensive
labor. 157 Rather, the nations designed the exchange explicitly to deal with
space concerns and the continued viability of two prison systems.158
Similarly, while Member of Parliament Austin (and to some extent,
Governor Schwarzenegger) suggested that inmates might be exported to
152. But cf Kilgore, supra note 30 (arguing that "the prison-industrial complex remains driven by
an agenda that is more about politics than profits").
153. Cf Hans-jfrg Albrecht, Sentencing in Germany, 76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 216 (2013)
("[T]he Dutch prisons over the last six years have been rapidly emptied, which resulted in the closing of
prisons.").
154. See CPT Report, supra note 8.
155. See id. at 14.
156. See supra Part II.
157. See also CPT Report, supra note 8, at 14.
158. We might imagine an alternate international exchange in which inmate labor were actually a
driver of the transaction. For instance, a nation with a dwindling population seeking to fill low-skill,
low-wage positions might seek out convict labor as a means of avoiding unions or other market forces
that might otherwise drive up costs in this sector of the market. Indeed, the purpose of addressing the
exchange through the prison labor frame in Part II was not only to highlight the inherent flaws with
forced carceral labor but also to suggest that such a labor-driven exchange-analogous to convict
leasing-might become a feature of the international landscape if a global market in inmates were to
expand.
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nations with harsher penal policies, 59 this intention is not evident in the
terms (or the reality) of the Belgian-Dutch exchange. 60 As an empirical
matter, the threat of transferring prisoners across borders may have some
added deterrent or retributive effect for would-be offenders. But in the very
limited international press coverage of the exchange, no government
official from Belgium or the Netherlands suggests that the exchange was
designed to further any particular philosophical ends or to achieve specific
results with regard to the prisoners themselves.161 Therefore, this final Part
addresses the exchange through a broader frame of prisons as institutions,
and individual prisoners not as criminological or penological subjects, but
as necessary components of the institutional and legal structure of the
prison.
In a moment of post-industrial struggle, where the U.S. and many
other developed nations are coming to grips with the post-industrial service
economy, the global prison market powerfully speaks to the peculiar and
unsettling nexus between criminal punishment and economic stability. For
nations that no longer thrive as manufacturing centers or that are seeing the
decline of industry, prisons have come to stand as a remaining space of
economic viability, an institution that continues to hire and provides a
social service. In light of this, perhaps the most instructive frame through
which to view this exchange may not be one in which the "traditional"
theories of punishment play a part,162 but rather one in which the political
economy of the prison takes center stage.
From the perspective of any of the traditionally accepted theories of
punishment,163 closing a prison for lack of prisoners would be a clear
success for society or at least a marker of a desirable social climate.164 To
the rehabilitationist, closure would signify no further need to socialize or
cure previously troubled or deviant inmates and presumably, as a corollary,
159. See Buchanan, supra note 6; Moss, supra note 1.
160. See generally CPT Report, supra note 8 (expressing a generally uncritical view of the prison
conditions faced by the transferred Belgian inmates). But cf supra note 99 (discussing the practice of
extraordinary rendition and the suggestion that it has been employed by the United States in an effort to
evade restrictions on the use of torture in interrogation).
161. See Buchanan, supra note 6; Moss, supra note 1.
162. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006) (listing, inter alia, the nature of the crime, deterrence,
public safety and offender rehabilitation as purposes of punishment).
163. Cf Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated
Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2000) ("Four purposes are
usually ascribed to criminal punishment: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.").
164. Assuming that the criminal justice system were otherwise functioning properly so that the
lack of prisoners stemmed from a lack of individuals committing crimes and not from a failure to
apprehend, convict, or punish law-breakers.
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a more stable and healthy society.165 The deterrence advocate would see
that those who needed to be deterred had been,166 just as the retributivist
would view the closure as a sign that the members of the polity had stopped
committing bad acts for which discipline was needed.167 Similarly, by the
logic of incapacitation, when society no longer requires facilities to contain
individuals posing a risk to public safety, it would follow that there are no
such risks and that society has achieved a secure state. 168
But considering the prison and the market in prisoners through any of
these theoretical frameworks, or even the frameworks taken together,
misses the reality of the modem penitentiary. Prisoners-how they are
treated and how they benefit or suffer from their periods of incarceration-
are far from the only interest of penal institutions. The prison system is not
just a space that houses inmates; rather, prisons are employers, workplaces,
landmarks, and foundations of communities across the United States and
around the globe.169 Where a factory or a mill once might have served as
the community center and marker of social and economic sustainability,
today, in many localities, the prison stands in its place.
Perhaps an instructive analog to the case of the Belgian-Dutch
exchange is a hypothetical nation with a sharply-declining youth population
but a massive educational infrastructure that decides to import children to
fill its schools. The children, like prisoners, become a sort of commodity,
the fuel necessary to sustain an otherwise-endangered economy. Schools,
like prisons, have no reason to exist in the abstract. Were there no children,
there would be no need for a school; were there no law-breakers, there
would be no need for a prison. Yet, in the hypothetical nation, schools have
become a fundamental component of society upon which the national
economy and nation's psyche depend, making their abolition both
impracticable and also a political impossibility.
In terms of national self-preservation, then, a rational nation would
import children to the extent that the nation could fill its classrooms with
165. See Cotton, supra note 163, at 1316-17.
166. See BENTHAM, supra note 73, at 158-60.
167. See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME (1997); Michael T. Cahill, Retributive
Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 815 (2007).
168. See FRANK ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION (1995).
169. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Radical Thought from Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, Through
Foucault, to the Present: Comments on Steven Lukes's In Defense of "False Consciousness", 2011 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 29, 36 (2011) (linking the relationship between mass incarceration and "the political
needs of adjacent counties whose economies depend entirely on guard labor and prison-related
industries").
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foreign students at a lesser cost than it would require to establish a new
industry or support those who would lose their jobs if the schools closed.170
The purpose of the school in this model would no longer be to enrich
students to become better adults and better members of the polity (a sort of
analog to the rehabilitative justification for incarceration) or even to keep
potentially unruly young people off the streets and out of trouble (more
analogous to the incapacitation justification); rather, it is to allow the
schools to survive and to perpetuate a dominant political economy and set
of institutions. With apologies to George Orwell, the object of prisons may
well be prisons.17 1
The hypothetical scenario that the Belgian-Dutch exchange conjures
up and that is generally implicated by the market in prisoners becomes a
sort of extreme version of "the new penology" described just over two
decades ago by Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon. 172 According to
Feeley and Simon, the goal of the criminal justice system had shifted away
from a rehabilitative model to a perverted form of incapacitation where
prisons serve "to manage populations of marginal citizens with no
concomitant effort toward integration into mainstream society." 73 The new
penology, in this account that has found purchase in much subsequent
criminological work, embraces a total separation of prisoner from society,
drawing stark lines between the community, and a new subclass or
underclass of criminals.' 74
To a certain extent, the Belgian-Dutch exchange, as proxy for what
might become a broader market in prisoners, exhibits elements of the new
penology. The extra-community punishment discussed at length in Part III,
170. Alternatively, the nation might attempt to increase the demand for education by increasing
degree or educational requirements for adults. While it falls outside of the scope of this Article, this
alternative solution raises a troubling possibility in the prison context: what if, instead of importing
prisoners, the Netherlands had passed more criminal statutes or criminalized more lawful behavior in an
effort to increase the number of criminals? That is, instead of using criminal law to preserve public
safety, to enforce moral views, or even to reform social practices, the Netherlands (or the prison
state/community) would be using criminal law to preserve the institutions and infrastructure of criminal
punishment.
171. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, 263 (1949) ("Power is not a means; it is an end. One does not
establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard a revolution; one makes the revolution in order to establish
the dictatorship. The object of persecution is persecution. The object of torture is torture. The object of
power is power.").
172. Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on an Emerging Strategy
of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 449 (1992).
173. Id. at 463.
174. Id. at 467. See also Sharon Dolovich, Confronting the Costs of Incarceration: Foreword:
Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 237, 252-54 (2009).
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supra, speaks powerfully to the lack of "concomitant effort toward
integration into mainstream society" identified by Feeley and Simon."' But
if we focus on the role of preserving and filling vacant prisons as essential
to the maintenance of a prison industrial complex, then the exchange and
such a nascent market may actually take the new penology to new
extremes. The prisoners have become so expendable, so divorced from any
understanding of community or political agency, that nations may trade and
traffic in them.
The Virginia Supreme Court, in its dismissal of concerns for
prisoners' rights in Ruffin, spoke of the prisoner as "civiliter mortuus," or
"civilly dead."' 76 When we consider the importation of prisoners to
preserve industry, it appears that the market in prisoners takes seriously this
de-humanization of prisoners, perhaps even extending beyond the case of
the supermax prisons that have been highlighted as emblematic of new
penology.177 Like Gogol's "dead souls," the prisoners cease to have
significance outside of their status as property or chips that can be
exchanged. 7 8 Incapacitation has ceased to be a theoretical justification for
punishment and has become a job in itself.
B. AVOIDING EXCEPTIONALISM
As in the context of the other frames, I argue that the Belgian-Dutch
case is exemplary more than it is exceptional. In the criminal justice
policies of the United States, the role of the prison may increasingly be not
just to punish, to rehabilitate, or even simply to incapacitate the social
deviant. Rather, the role of the prison may be to be.179 "[I]n the United
States today, incarceration is more than just a mode of criminal
punishment," contends Sharon Dolovich.so "It is a distinct cultural practice
175. Feeley & Simon, supra note 172, at 463.
176. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871). The court goes on to hold that the
prisoner's "estate, if he has any, is administered like that of a dead man." Id. See also William B. Mack
Ill, Justice for Some: Excessive Force Claims after Porter v. Nussle, 36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
265, 267-68 (2003).
177. See Dolovich, supra note 48.
178. See NIKOLAI GOGOL, DEAD SOULS (Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky trans., Vintage
1997) (1842). In Gogol's novel, the "dead souls" were dead serfs who might still be counted as property
and traded by those clever or unscrupulous enough to acquire and deal in them. See id.
179. Cf Patrice A. Fulcher, Hustle and Flow: Prison Privatization Fueling the Prison Industrial
Complex, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 589, 599 (2012) ("Contrarily, in utilizing the services of private prison
corporations, governments have not only given up the responsibility to manage inmate populations, they
have also allowed the purpose of punishment to shift from its original public objectives to one of
profiteering." (citation omitted)).
180. Dolovich, supra note 174, at 237.
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with its own aesthetic and technique, a practice that has emerged in recent
decades as a catch-all mechanism for managing social ills."' 8 ' The prison
and the criminal justice system exist (at least in part) to perpetuate
themselves and to maintain a culture that views incarceration as an
essential component of the state and its survival.182
Criminal law scholars, criminologists, and penal reformers have, of
late, focused on the rise of private prisons, critiquing this trend as
corrupting the carceral system with private interests that are often opposed
to prisoners' and society's best interests.1 83 Further, by interjecting private
interests into the ostensibly public space of criminal punishment, 184
privatization of prisons, critics suggest, detracts from the Durkheimian or
quasi-Durkheimian expressive or ritualistic function of criminal law.' 85 As
Mary Sigler argues, "[t]he delegation of punishment through prison
privatization attenuates the meaning of punishment in a liberal state and
undermines the institution of criminal justice."l86 However, should these
181. Id. See also supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
182. Cf Wagner, supra note 130 ("By crediting rural prison towns with urban prisoners, the New
York Legislature is helping to postpone, for at least another decade, a democratic debate over the best
way to address crime, drugs and unemployment.").
183. See, e.g., CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PROS 45-48 (1990); Ira P.
Robbins, Privatization of Corrections: A Violation of U.S. Domestic Law, International Human Rights,
and Good Sense, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 12, 12 (2006) ("Critics argue that as a matter of policy it is
inappropriate to operate prisons with a profit motive, which provides no incentive to reduce
overcrowding (especially if the company is paid on a per-prisoner basis), to consider alternatives to
incarceration, or to deal with the broader problems of criminal justice. On the contrary, critics assert
that the incentive would be to build more prisons and jails, which would be filled with more prisoners."
(footnote omitted)); Sharon Dolovich, State Punishments and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 441-
42 (2005) ("Incarceration is among the most severe and intrusive manifestations of power the state
exercises against its own citizens. When the state incarcerates, it strips offenders of their liberty and
dignity and consigns them for extended periods to conditions of severe regimentation and physical
vulnerability. Before seeking to ensure efficient incarceration, therefore, it must first be determined if
the particular penal practice at issue is even legitimate."); Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The
Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REv. 879
(2004) (detailing in depth the drawbacks of prison privatization).
184. For a critique of the public/private distinction in this context, see Levin, American Gangsters,
supra note 90, at 118 ("In some situations (perhaps even in most situations), we may be comfortable
with the private interests that are served (e.g., of the victim of an assault) or we may feel as though the
private interests are sufficiently representative of broader societal interests (e.g., we are all potential
victims). Because the public interest that the criminal law serves is simply a conglomeration of private
interests, the criminal law-like other ostensibly public institutions-can be both designed and
implemented in such a way as to have a substantial social and economic structuring effect, to skew the
balance of power heavily in favor of a given interest, or to marginalize and to delegitimize an opposing
interest.").
185. Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meanings of Punishment, 38 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 149, 151 (2010).
186 Id
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concerns about troubling "private" incentives unrelated to theories of
punishment be cordoned off from discussions of "public" systems of
punishment and reserved only for discussion of private prisons or private
contracting?
What the Belgian-Dutch exchange and the potential global market in
prisons shows us so powerfully is the fallacy of the distinction between
markets, private action, and financial interests on the one hand and an
idealized criminal justice system on the other.187 Indeed, put more simply,
what this exchange demonstrates is that it need not take corporate actors or
private contractors in order to engineer a system of carceral institutions
designed in the interests of financial benefit. The Belgian-Dutch exchange
was decidedly public-nation states and not private entities drew up the
terms and facilitated the transfer of prisoners. But, as in other legal areas,
many governments faced with economic downturns have adopted the view
that governments should be "run like businesses" favoring efficiency over
other concerns for the public good.1 8
While Sigler's critique hones in on a major shortcoming of private
prisons, and while the suggestion of an explicitly identified market in
prisoners may rightly cause concern for many already wary of encroaching
prison privatization, this Part has argued that the targets of these criticisms
are already firmly entrenched in U.S. penal policy. Looking back at the
discussion of domestic prison transfers in Part III, supra, it is important to
recall that the public prison system and the laws that structure it have
already attenuated inmates from the community and the sort of idealized
liberalism suggested by Sigler.'" The specter of convict leasing discussed
in Part II, supra, may well haunt U.S. penal policy and the move to
privatize, but convict labor has become firmly entrenched in the public
prison infrastructure.
In short, the exchange of inmates as a market within the growing
space of the prison industrial complex represents a critical marriage of
private and public, an embodiment both of state violence and of its
relationship to the preservation of private markets.190 Under the banner of
the new penology, and coupled with the prevalent model of government as
187. Cf Kilgore, supra note 30 ("State-owned prisons and political agendas continue to lie at the
center of mass incarceration. The combined revenue of CCA and the GEO Group for 2012 was less
than half of the California state corrections budget.").
188. See Richard Michael Fischl, "Running the Government Like a Business ": Wisconsin and the
Assault on Workplace Democracy, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 39, 39-41 (2011).
189. Cf Sigler, supra note 185, at 151.
190. See supra note 181.
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business,'91 prisoners transferred throughout U.S. state and federal systems
change hands and homes not because of some societal quest for greater
rehabilitative or retributive effect but because of logistical and practical
concerns. Prisons must preserve public safety and employment. Perhaps
Belgium and the Netherlands, much like the United States, have embraced
a model of prisons as "factories with fences";' 92 however, instead of
inmates producing license plates (as in Justice Burger's vision), what we
are left with are states, societies, and communities often producing
punishment.
C. A MORE POSITIVE GLOSS?
It is worth noting that this Part, like the rest of this Article, has
generally treated the Belgian-Dutch exchange and any broader market that
it might portend through a critical lens.' 93 But, what if a market in prisoners
has social benefits? The framework presented in this Part explicitly treats
the market as a means of resource allocation and, in so doing, brings us
back to the economic analysis presented by Kontorovich and the political
economy of the prison. Kontorovich refers to the efficiency-based concept
of "the cheapest justice provider," finding some nations better suited to
trying (in the case of the Somali pirates) or punishing criminals. 94 If we
are concerned with the issues raised in this Article, is it possible that this
sort of "comparative advantage" in incarceration might still have an
upside?
What if Nation X proved to be exceptionally good at incarceration?
Imagine that for $10,000 a year, per prisoner, Nation X could guarantee a
recidivism rate that was seventy-five percent lower than any U.S. prison's.
In short, for a small fee, the United States could enhance the chances that
punishment would work and that incarceration would lead to the socially
desired outcome.1 95 If feasible, why would we not want a global division of
state-labor that would result in Nation X being responsible for reforming
U.S. deviants?
First, the positive gloss as represented by the Nation X hypothetical is
premised on a single theory of punishment (or at least a confined universe
of what we are looking for in incarceration). That is, recidivism rates are
191. See Fischi, supra note 188, at 39-41.
192. Burger, supra note 32.
193. But see supra note 170.
194. Kontorovich, supra note 4.
195. This outcome would vary depending on our theory of punishment-i.e., greater and more
proportional punishment; optimal deterrence; ctc.
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certainly important if we view prison as a rehabilitationist enterprise or
perhaps even from a general public safety perspective, but what if we are
retributivists? This response, however, may be more of a dodge than a
parry, as we could imagine an alternate hypothetical in which Nation X is
not only a model of rehabilitative excellence, with marked declines in
recidivism, but its prisons are also fiercely disciplinarian, satisfying the
public's desire for retribution. Indeed, we can imagine a nation that is
paragon of every theory of punishment or that somehow succeeds in
balancing a multiplicity of theoretical commitments. However, the further
afield we drift in constructing our optimal carceral nation, the less plausible
our hypothetical becomes, rendering that trade-offs between efficiency and
other values less clear than in the initial Nation X hypothetical.
Perhaps more importantly, returning to the discussion of the role of
punishment in the community, can Nation X actually socialize prisoners to
be good members of polity/Nation Y? This is a version of the hypotheticals
involving prisoner Bob offered above. In New York state,196 it may be that
we think that largely non-white, higher crime urban communities should
look more like Franklin, Malone, or Auburn, New York, so that these
distant carceral spaces will help shape better citizens who can reform their
hometowns. But such a scenario more closely resembles one community
policing and reforming another, rather than a single community policing
and punishing for its own internal reform. Criminal law generally may have
imperialist or culturally imperialist qualities, but this clear distinction
between the punishers and the punished would be an extreme example.
Additionally, what would such a system of criminal nations and
carceral nations do to the nation that becomes the punisher?19 ' It may be
that Nation X has a comparative advantage in punishing, but what happens
when Nation X becomes a nation of jailers? Further, what happens when
Nation Y ceases to punish its own criminals?
It may be that the expansion of such a market would serve the interests
of efficiency and ultimately increase public good by: (1) making
196. See supra notes 130-144, and accompanying text.
197. Perhaps the best analog here is to the psychological or social impact on an executioner. On
the one hand, it is conceivable that the executioner would become more morally conscious and
convinced of the importance of doing good as a result of her job. On the other hand, studies suggest that
executioners often experience trauma and psychological issues as a result of their function in carrying
out punishment. See generally Lauren M. De Lilly, Note, "Antithetical to Human Dignity ": Secondary
Trauma, Evolving Standards of Decency, and the Unconstitutional Consequences of State-Sanctioned
Executions, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 107, 123 (2014) (noting, inter alia, that "secondary trauma is
prevalent among those who carry out executions").
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punishment more successful (using whichever metric or theory we might
prefer to gauge success); (2) freeing up resources for other social programs
or decreasing the amount of tax revenue that governments must raise; or (3)
preventing other, less desirable means of addressing declining prison
populations (e.g., criminalizing more previously lawful conduct or
increasing the duration of prison sentences).' 98 However, as this Article
contends, these potential benefits bear with them a range of costs and
collateral consequences that would unmoor criminal punishment further
from its theoretical justifications and from its accepted place in liberal
democratic societies.
V. CONCLUSION
The view of incarceration that I suggest the global prison market
ultimately implicates is one that is increasingly detached from theories of
retributivism, deterrence, or rehabilitation. Rather, as scholars of the new
penology suggest, the critical paradigm is one of incapacitation.199
However, as I have argued, what makes the global prison market so
unnerving is not simply that it is rooted in a segregationist mentality that
looks to banishment and extraterritorial punishment as a mechanism for
avoiding the economically and morally costly externalities of mass
incarceration.200 Instead, it is that incarceration and incapacitation have
increasingly become inextricable from the function of the state and from
the essential stability of global markets.
We no longer need jails only so that a community might discipline its
members and protect itself by excluding those who have sinned; rather, in
parts of the United States and in the nascent global prison market,
incarceration has become almost inextricable from governance. In
maintaining stable domestic economies, the prison has replaced the factory,
and the inmate has replaced the steel and the automobile. Communities
198. See supra note 170. As noted above, there has been no suggestion first and third potential
benefits identified here (i.e., more effective punishment and preventing a push to incarcerate more
individuals to fill empty prison).
199. See, e.g., GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 11; Dolovich, supra
note 48; Feeley & Simon, supra note 172, at 463.
200. The Belgian-Dutch exchange lacks a number of the characteristics of banishment, and, as
discussed at length above, the impetus for the exchange was not punitive banishment. Indeed, this is one
of the factors that helps distinguish the Belgian-Dutch exchange from historical prison colony
arrangements. Nevertheless, in order to contextualize the potential market in inmates in the context of
contemporary trends in criminal punishment, it is worth noting that banishment has resurfaced as a form
of punishment in a number of U.S. cities. See Katherine Beckett & Steve Herbert, Penal Boundaries:
Banishment and the Expansion of Punishment, 35 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 5-9 (2010).
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across the United States have come to rely upon the carceral system both to
employ their members and also to define what it means to be an
"American" and a functional member of the polity.201 In short, the global
prison market embodies Foucault's concept of the state as purveyor of
security and governance through control of bodies,202 but as we look at
Northern Europe and then back to the prison-dependent communities of
Leavenworth, Kansas, Huntsville, Texas, or Malone, New York, it becomes
difficult to identify whose security is being preserved and where to draw
the lines between morality, economic necessity, and perhaps simply the
runaway train of political inertia.
201. See, e.g., Beveridge, supra note 130; Wagner, supra note 130.
202. See, e.g., FOUCAULT, supra note 72, at 110 ("The state of government, which essentially
bears on the population and calls upon and employs economic knowledge as an instrument, would
correspond to a society controlled by apparatuses of society"); id. at 328 ("So, it seems to me that the
object of police is everything from being to well-being, everything that may produce this well-being
beyond being, and in such a way that the well-being of individuals is the state's strength.").
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